

ESEMINAR SUMMARY

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CSG eSeminars
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CONTEMPORARY DEBATES ON PEACEBUILDING AND STATEBUILDING: NEW CHALLENGES, SHARP DIVISIONS




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Refugees, IDPs and Peacebuilding in the Contemporary Middle East

Conflicts in Syria, Iraq, Libya and Yemen continue to fuel a regional refugee crisis on an unprecedented scale. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), there are 4.8 million Syrian refugees in the region and at least 6.5 million internally displaced people (IDPs) in Syria.¹ Outside of Syria there are another 4.4 million IDPs in Iraq, 2.5 million IDPs in Yemen and 417,000 IDPs in Libya.² The crisis is also straining countries that have opened their doors to refugees: Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan had by 2016 accepted over 2.5 million, 1.03 million and 653,000 Syrian refugees, respectively. The influx of refugees has created profound challenges for these countries as they struggle to provide adequate housing, healthcare, and opportunities for education and employment. The situation of refugees and IDPs is both a humanitarian catastrophe and a complex and ongoing challenge to peace and security in the region.



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On November 25, 2015, the Centre for Security Governance (CSG), in cooperation with the Balsillie School of International Affairs (BSIA) and Wilfrid Laurier University's (WLU's) Global Studies department hosted the third in a series of eight online seminars focusing on the theme of "Contemporary Debates on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding." The event examined the regional refugee crisis fuelled by conflicts in Syria, Iraq, Libya and Yemen, with a particular focus on Syrian refugees. Our distinguished panellists discussed how the refugee and IDP crisis should factor into peacebuilding approaches throughout the region. Some of the key topics and questions that arose as part of the discussion included:

- The ability of refugees to play a constructive role in peacebuilding, rather than necessarily acting as drivers of conflict.
- The potential for refugee flows to create conflict and instability in the countries bordering Syria, which have collectively accepted more than four million refugees.
- The economic conditions facing refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and Iraq, and the challenges these governments face in pursuing economic and social integration.
- The educational opportunities available to refugee children in neighbouring countries and the risk of a "lost generation" of Syrian children.

About the eSeminar Series

The Centre for Security Governance eSeminars are a series of virtual meetings that bring together experts and practitioners from around the world to discuss security sector reform (SSR) and related themes, issues, and case studies. The eSeminars are open to the public, and includes an eSeminar Summary report and eSeminar Videos. For information on upcoming eSeminars, please visit <http://www.secgovcentre.org/events>.

Series Editor: Mark Sedra

Report Author: Geoff Burt

Copy Editor: Jennifer Goyder

About the CSG

The Centre for Security Governance (CSG) is a non-profit, non-partisan think tank dedicated to the study of security and governance transitions in fragile, failed and conflict-affected states. Based in Canada, the CSG maintains a global, multi-disciplinary network of researchers, practitioners and academics engaged in the international peace and security field.

Centre for Security Governance

Tel: +1 226 241 8744

Email: info@secgovcentre.org

Web: www.secgovcentre.org

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Introduction

The refugee crisis unfolding in Syria, Iraq, Libya and Yemen is not solely a humanitarian issue. It has also created new fault lines of conflict, both within these countries and in neighbouring countries, which have absorbed by far the largest numbers of refugees. Beyond providing an overview of the conditions facing refugees and refugee-hosting countries, this eSeminar focused on how this forced migration will impact future peacebuilding efforts in the region and what policies will help refugees support rather than undermine peacebuilding.

The event began with each of the panellists making a 12-minute presentation. The first speaker, Dr. James Milner, presented a framework for understanding the role of refugees in peacebuilding, suggesting that policies that facilitate political inclusion and economic opportunity for refugees can have important benefits to peacebuilding. Dr. Philippe Fargues gave a detailed account of the conditions facing refugees and IDPs in Syria and neighbouring countries, discussing the challenges facing host governments and the emerging tensions between citizens, refugees and governments in the region. Dr. Kim Rygiel's remarks focused on Turkey's policy toward Syrian refugees and issues relating to their legal status, economic and educational opportunities and access to government services. The event concluded with an open discussion period where participants

were able to engage directly with the panellists. The next section of the report will summarize the key findings of each presentation and the discussion period.

Box 1: Refugee and IDP Statistics

- 4.8 million Syrian refugees in the region, including:
 - 2.7 million registered in Turkey by the Government;
 - 1.03 million registered in Lebanon by UNHCR;
 - 657,000 registered in Jordan by UNHCR.
- 494,947 Syrian refugees (or 10 percent of the total) are living in refugee camps, while 4.3 million (90 percent) are living in urban, peri-urban or rural communities.
- More than 13 million IDPs in the region, including:
 - 6.5 million Syrian IDPs;
 - 4.4 million Iraqi IDPs;
 - 2.5 million Yemeni IDPs;
 - 417,000 Libyan IDPs.

Source: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Syria Regional Refugee Response: Inter-agency Information Sharing Portal, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, International Organization for Migration (IOM).

Summary of Presentations

Speaker 1 – Dr. James Milner

In giving a global overview of the connection between refugees and peacebuilding, the event's first panellist, Dr. James Milner, introduced two disconnects between current peacebuilding approaches and our knowledge of the dynamics of modern refugee crises. First, while there have been a number of encouraging institutional developments, particularly from the United Nations,³ peacebuilding still tends to be funded and implemented with a country-specific approach, even though we know that conflicts often have a significant cross-border dimension and may be fuelled by external conflict drivers, for instance the presence of large numbers of refugees. Second, those who study refugees tend to view the return of refugees as a barometer of the effectiveness of peacebuilding, while the role of refugees to either support or undermine peacebuilding is rarely acknowledged, even though research shows that refugees in exile can have significant impacts on conflict in their country of origin.

The role of refugees in peacebuilding is critical, considering that today's refugees spend an average of 18 years in exile, a number that has more than doubled since the end of the Cold War.⁴ While refugee populations are typically viewed as conflict drivers, they can also support peacebuilding under the right

circumstances. Their protracted exile can give refugees the opportunity to develop new skills and perspectives that can be useful to their country of origin when they return. As a way to frame the relationship between refugees and peacebuilding, Milner introduced the five core elements of effective peacebuilding identified in UN's 2009 *Report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict*: support to basic safety and security; support to political processes; support to the provision of basic services; support to restoring core government functions; and support to economic revitalization.⁵

Milner noted in each of these five core elements of peacebuilding, both opportunities and challenges arise when refugee populations in exile are included as part of our understanding of the peacebuilding process. For instance, while refugees are often thought of as potential spoilers to political settlements, steps can be taken to mitigate their impact, such as providing peace education programs and targeting youth engagement in refugee camps. When there are political actors in exile among refugee populations, it may be beneficial to allow them to participate directly in the peace process, either by soliciting their feedback or allowing them to send representatives to negotiations. Refugees should also be considered in post-conflict electoral processes, where decisions on whether they are eligible to vote may undermine or reinforce the legitimacy of the post-conflict political landscape. With respect

to the provision of basic services, the impact of refugees can depend in large part on the pace and scale of their return. A sudden and unsustainable push for return can place additional burdens on government services and promote conflict. Again, efforts can be made to mitigate these effects, including providing skills and training to refugees while they are in exile (as was done, for instance, with refugees from South Sudan with the training of health workers and teachers). Other forward-looking steps can be taken while refugees remain in exile, including assisting refugees to attain important identity documentation and, crucially, to begin to address issues of land claims and titles.

With respect to the current refugee crisis in the Middle East and North Africa, one of the most important factors determining the impact of refugees on broader peacebuilding efforts will be their ability to be economically productive while in exile. The ability of refugees to achieve economic self-reliance and even to contribute to the post-conflict economic revival of their country will depend in large part on the asylum policies of hosting states. Contrary to the recommendations of the UN Secretary-General, many states are taking measures that limit the economic opportunities of refugees. For instance, Syrian refugees in Jordan and Somali refugees in Kenya are presently denied the right to work.

To better address the role of refugees in peacebuilding, Milner noted a need to expand

our conception of peacebuilding theory and practice in terms of “time, space and scope.” Taking a longer-term view of peacebuilding and making an ongoing investment in the success of refugees in exile as peacebuilding actors would help address some of the problems associated with protracted refugee crises. Expanding the geographical scope of where peacebuilding takes place allows the consideration of regional dynamics, better captures the significances of refugees and opens up peacebuilding opportunities in neighbouring states. Broadening the scope of which actors are considered in peacebuilding programming would help policy makers and practitioners leverage the potentially positive impact of refugees in peacebuilding.

Speaker 2 – Dr. Philippe Fargues

Dr. Philippe Fargues’ remarks were chiefly focused on the Syrian refugee crisis, which he noted is the worst refugee crisis since World War II, having already displaced 12 million people, including both IDPs and refugees. As a starting point to understand the regional context of the Syrian refugee crisis, Fargues emphasized that while the Middle East is the largest source of refugees, it is also the largest destination.⁶ Syria’s refugees can be divided into three distinct groups. First, there is a group of seven million Syrians that are internally displaced but have not been able to leave the country. The second group, numbering more than four million, are refugees in the four

bordering states (Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and Iraq). The third, and smallest group (estimated between 500,000 to one million), is made up of Syrian refugees in non-bordering states. All of those numbers continue to grow.⁷

He began by characterizing the experience of the Syrian refugee population living in the four bordering states. Approximately 50 percent of these refugees are children. Among adults, the majority are women. A minority of refugees are hosted in camps, whereas the majority are based in local communities.⁸ The urgent issues facing these refugees are housing, employment, education, health and protection. Children are particularly vulnerable and many have to work to generate income for their families.

In many cases, it is possible to draw a distinction between the official response of the state and the hospitality of the citizens in the bordering state. The populations in general have been hospitable, whereas the state response was tolerant but at the same time served to marginalize the refugees. Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq are not signatories of the Geneva Convention and consequently do not provide an official status for refugees. Refugees in those states are considered to be guests and have received temporary permits to stay; when these permit expire they then become irregular migrants. Refugees do not have the right to employment and consequently are obliged to work in the informal sector. Their status also leaves them with poor access to state services.

Fargues noted that these policies demonstrate the real goal of these states, which is that “they just do not want the refugees to settle.” Some of the state responses to refugees have changed over time. Two states (Jordan and Lebanon) have started to take measures to prevent the arrival of new refugees and to restrict the stay of those already in the country. Coupled with drastic reductions in external aid to refugees and the growing hostility of local populations (as evidenced by recent surveys in Lebanon), it is little surprise that conditions facing refugees have begun to deteriorate. There is now a widespread sentiment that Syrians will stay longer than initially expected and it is becoming evident that countries do not want to offer stable settlements. The refugee populations are placing extreme financial strains on Syria’s neighbours and, consequently, refugees are being blamed for general unemployment, inflation and insecurity.

The potential for intracommunal conflicts is heightened by the presence of the refugees. For instance in Lebanon, tensions between Sunnis and Shia may be stoked by the fact that the migration of Syrian Sunnis has altered the demographic balance of the country, elevating the Sunnis population from the third-largest religious group in the country to the largest. In Turkey, Kurdish refugees are exacerbating existing ethnic tensions. Another demographic challenge can be seen within Syria, where large-scale population displacement has increased communal homogeneity and led to

the emergence of a clear distinction between the western and eastern parts of Syria. Today the west is more than ever composed of minorities and the east is becoming an entirely Sunni territory. This population displacement could threaten the very existence of Syria as a nation-state, leading Fargues to raise a key question: is rebuilding Syria a realistic goal or should we anticipate the division of Syria?

Echoing Milner's remarks, Fargues emphasized that the economic conditions facing refugees will be a crucial factor in their ability to contribute to peacebuilding. Fargues argued that their displacement has created an unsustainable economic situation for Syria's neighbours. International agencies have recommended turning the burden of refugees into an asset by including them in local labour markets. Fargues stressed the importance of generating economic opportunities for refugees but at the same time he pointed out that "the challenge ahead is to not create competition in the labour market with locals," who already perceive the refugee population as an economic threat.⁹

Speaker 3 – Dr. Kim Rygiel

Dr. Kim Rygiel's presentation focused on Turkey's approach to its Syrian refugee population, which at approximately 2.5 million is the largest in the world. In March 2016 Turkish and EU leaders reached a comprehensive agreement on refugees intended to limit the number of refugees reaching Europe, while promising

financial assistance and a renewed path to EU membership to Turkey.¹⁰ Nonetheless, as a representative of the International Rescue Committee pointed out: "we should be under no illusion that the EU-Turkey deal will bring an end to the refugee crisis."¹¹

Some Syrian refugees are hosted in 25 government-led camps (distributed mainly along the border) but the majority of refugees are living in urban centres. Turkey is a signatory of the Geneva Convention and as a consequence the vast majority of refugees have been given temporary asylum status. The April 2014 Law on Foreigners and International Protection made the Directorate General of Migration Management the sole institution responsible for asylum matters, and expanded protections available to Syrians.¹² It stipulates that displaced persons cannot be returned to Syria against their will and also gives them the right to access Turkish territory. But at the same time this legislation also puts Syrians in a state of limbo: "on the one hand it provided limited social rights in Turkey, but on the other hand they are not resettled as refugees." In practice this status actually drives many Syrians into a more precarious position and may also push them into undertaking the dangerous journey to reach the European Union. Regardless, Turkey is seen as the country offering the best conditions for Syrian refugees among the four neighbouring countries.

Rygiel discussed the conditions facing Syrian refugees in Turkey. When they arrive they must register with the Disaster Management Agency, which provides them with an identity card that allows access to certain basic services. For instance, all medical costs and 80 percent of prescription drug costs are covered. According to Turkey's Ministry of Health, Syrian refugees have accessed the Turkish health care system some 15.3 million times since 2011.¹³ Syrians also have access to free education, like Turkish citizens, but in practice some struggle to afford transportation and clothing costs. Moreover, cases have been reported in which Syrians were told that there was no place for them in schools. Language is another complex issue and frequently a driver of discrimination. As a result of these impediments, only a small percentage of refugee children are in school (a number estimated to be around 14 percent), raising the possibility of a lost generation of school-age children, as the longer they are out of school the less likely they will ever go back.¹⁴ The Turkish system also does not cover the cost of accommodation outside of government camps, which in major cities like Istanbul can be very high.

The last and most significant issue facing Syrian refugees in Turkey is access to employment. On January 15, 2016, the Turkish government introduced regulations to grant many of the 2.5 million Syrian refugees work permits.¹⁵ The previous legislation did not give automatic access to the right to employment, but rather required

Syrians to apply for the right. To satisfy this requirement, they had to first find a Turkish company willing to hire them. However, refugees are not permitted to exceed 10 percent of employees in any workforce.¹⁶ Since 2011, only 118 work permits have been delivered under this system, demonstrating the total inadequacy of this framework in generating access to employment. As a consequence, most Syrians have been limited to illegal and precarious forms of employment: many are now being employed as dishwashers or in construction. In the south of the country, Syrians have found work hand-picking cotton, displacing Kurdish workers. Tensions between the two groups are consequently emerging. In spite of Turkey's investment in integration, there is evidence of increasing tensions between Syrians and the local population.

Discussion Period and Key Themes

The eSeminar concluded with a question and answer session moderated by Dr. Bessma Momani. One of the first themes discussed was the viability of repatriation for the Syrian refugees once the conflict has ended. A participant, Dr. Branka Marijan, asked Dr. Milner to what extent it is reasonable to expect refugees to return home after the conflict ends. Milner suggested that this depends strongly on the context to which they will be returning. He cautioned against using the return of refugees as a barometer of success for peacebuilding

initiatives, suggesting that we need to de-link the notion of repatriation as the only solution or measure to successful peacebuilding. For instance, resettlement can be another durable solution.

Education was a key theme discussed in the eSeminar. The challenge of providing adequate educational opportunities for refugees has raised fears of a “lost generation” of Syrian children.¹⁷ If educational opportunities cannot be provided to refugees, “thousands of refugee children may reach adulthood without ever enjoying even a first day of school.”¹⁸ The global initiative No Lost Generation — a partnership among UN agencies, international and local NGOs, governments, international donors and the private sector — was launched in 2013 to focus attention on the urgent need to educate refugee children.¹⁹ In Lebanon, an innovative approach to scheduling, referred to as a “double-shift system,” has local Lebanese children educated in the mornings, while the same classrooms are used for refugee classes in the afternoon and evening.²⁰ The panellists were asked to elaborate on education opportunities available to Syrian refugees in Turkey outside of government schools. Dr. Rygiel noted that organizations like ASAM are providing Turkish language classes to children and also providing opportunities to play in order to help them work through the trauma that they have experienced.²¹ To help ease the transition, some schools are teaching in Arabic and introducing Turkish language classes gradually over time.

While all of Syria’s neighbours have introduced programs to accommodate Syrian children in schools, they require as much as US\$1.4 billion in funding.²²

Another theme in the discussion period was the link between refugees and security. Dr. Mark Sedra, the executive director of the Centre for Security Governance, raised the issue that refugee camps are often viewed as fertile ground for militant and terrorist recruitment that can spur violence and conflict. He asked the panellists whether this was accurate and, if so, how to combat the problem. Milner referred to the work of Sarah Kenyon Lischer on refugee camps and militarization.²³ Lischer’s book, *Dangerous Sanctuaries: Refugee Camps, Civil War, and the Dilemmas of Humanitarian Aid*, examines which kinds of refugee populations are more predisposed to militarization. Her research shows that refugees from what she calls “states in exile” and refugees from extreme regimes (for instance Rwanda or Eastern DRC) — where there is a political group committed to returning to the country of origin and retaking power — are the most prone to militarization. On the contrary, persecuted minorities and those who have fled violence are less likely to be militarized. With respect to the Syrian refugee situation, Dr. Fargues mentioned in his presentation that it was felt that refugee camps along the Syrian border had become hotbeds for extremism and had in many cases been infiltrated by ISIS operatives. Concerning the security of refugees themselves, Dr.

Janel Smith asked the panel to discuss the issue of human trafficking and forced labour in both Syria and its neighbours. Rygiel noted that the main trafficking concern relates to the safety of children, as cases of missing children have been increasing.

Finally, the panellists discussed the potential for refugees to play a constructive role in peacebuilding in the region. Dr. Timothy Donais from Wilfrid Laurier University asked whether — given their struggles just to survive — it is realistic to expect that refugees could also be “agents” of peacebuilding. Milner argued that it depends on whether certain preconditions are met that would enable the refugees to become agents of change. In particular, it depends strongly on the conditions they experience in exile. Current conditions, for instance, are not conducive to preparing refugees to play an active and positive role in peacebuilding. The evidence from the five core areas of peacebuilding that Milner previously discussed shows that “where opportunities are created while in exile, where there is engagement with the refugees, where they are involved in the design of the peacebuilding program, that is where refugees are able to make the most positive contribution.”

Conclusion

In her concluding remarks, Dr. Rygiel emphasized that as long as Syrian refugees do not have full rights and are not able to work in neighbouring countries, they will seek out better opportunities. Currently there are no safe ways for them to do this. Instead, what we are seeing are attempts to securitize borders and a tendency to treat refugees as security threats.

Dr. Milner noted that notwithstanding the scale of the crisis, this is not the first time the international community has encountered large-scale refugee situations. This is a real opportunity to have a conversation about how responses to refugees can move beyond a narrow humanitarian approach and be integrated more fully into other peacebuilding platforms and programs. Overall, he emphasized that we must “make sure that the responses are not reactive but are comprehensive, collaborative and rights based.”

In his concluding remarks, Dr. Fargues emphasized that refugee movements from Syria and the Middle East are certain to continue. The Middle East is now host to more than 50 percent of the world’s protracted refugee situations. Europe should remain open to refugees not only for ethical reasons but for security reasons as well. As Fargues noted “we don’t want more failed states and we don’t want Lebanon to be a third failed state.” In his view, the present situation has the potential to result in a very rapidly deteriorating security environment. Fargues cautions against

listening to those voices in Europe that suggest closing the borders, as this would be the wrong approach “not only for refugees but also for ourselves.”

The refugee crisis in the Middle East and North Africa is a complex humanitarian disaster affecting millions of innocent victims. Beyond its tragic human toll, it has also proven to be a challenge for regional systems of housing, healthcare and education. By reshaping demographics and distorting labour markets, the influx of refugees also threatens to create new conflict dynamics. Beyond the challenges, though, are opportunities to engage refugee populations as part of a broader peacebuilding program. Refugees can be a driver of conflict, but given the right conditions, they can also be a facilitator of peace.

Notes

¹ See UNHCR (2016), “Syria Regional Refugee Response: Inter-agency Information Sharing Portal”, Available at: <http://data.unhcr.org>.

The number of IDPs is reported in Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (2016), “Syria IDP Figures Analysis,” Available online at: www.internal-displacement.org/middle-east-and-north-africa/syria/figures-analysis.

² Figures from UNHCR (2016), “Syria Regional Refugee Response: Inter-agency Information Sharing Portal”, UNHCR (2016), “Global Focus: Iraq,” ; UNHCR (2016), “Global Focus: Yemen”, data and reports available online at <http://data.unhcr.org> and <http://reporting.unhcr.org>; and International Organization for Migration (IOM) (2016), “Over 417,000 Internally Displaced in Libya: IOM Report,” Available online at: www.iom.int/news/over-417000-internally-displaced-libya-iom-report.

³ For instance, the UN Peacebuilding Commission, UN Peacebuilding Support Office and UN Peacebuilding Support Fund.

⁴ For some examples of Milner’s work on protracted refugee situations, see James Milner and Gil Loescher (2011), “Responding to protracted refugee situations: Lessons from a decade of discussion,” Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford; Gil Loescher, James Milner, Edward Newman and Gary Troeller, eds., *Protracted Refugee Situations: Political, Human Rights and Security Implications* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2008); Gil Loescher and James Milner (2005), *Protracted Refugee Situations: Domestic and International Security Implications*. International Institute for Security Studies (IISS), Adelphi Papers.

⁵ The full list can be found in United Nations Security Council (2009), *Report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict*, June 11, page 6.

⁶ The role of the European Union has been significant (receiving 10 percent of the total number of Syrian refugees), but has been riddled with obstacles. Most significantly, the absence of a humanitarian visa program means that in order to lodge a claim, Syrians have to reach the territory of the EU, which has resulted in the deaths of 455 migrants

in the Mediterranean alone between January 1 and March 10, 2016, according to the IOM. See IOM (2016), “Missing Migrants Project,” Available at: <http://missingmigrants.iom.int/infographics>.

⁷ For up-to-date figures on these populations, see Françoise de Bel-Air (2016), “Migration Profile: Syria,” Migration Policy Centre (European University Institute).

⁸ In particular in Lebanon this has taken the form of informal settlements where refugees found unoccupied space. The UNHCR reported that among the total number of registered Syrian refugees, only 10 percent are living in refugee camps, while the remaining 90 percent are living in urban, peri-urban and rural areas. See UNHCR (2016), “Syria Regional Refugee Response: Inter-Agency Information Sharing Portal.”

⁹ For a discussion of the impact of Syrian refugees on Turkey’s labour market, see Ximena V. Del Carpio and Mathis Wagner (2015), “The Impact of Syrian Refugees on the Turkish Labor Market,” Policy Research Working Paper No. 7402, World Bank.

¹⁰ European Council (2016), “EU-Turkey statement, 18 March 2016”. Available at: www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18-eu-turkey-statement/.

¹¹ Karolina Tagaris and Lefteris Karagiannopoulos (2016). “Migrant arrivals to Greece rise sharply despite EU-Turkey deal,” *Reuters*, March 30.

¹² For more discussion on Turkey’s legal framework for refugees, see Rebecca Kilberg (2014), “Turkey’s Evolving Migration Identity,” Migration Policy Institute. For an excellent discussion of Turkey’s evolving approach to Syrian refugees, see Ahmet İçduygu (2015), “Syrian Refugees in Turkey: The Long Road Ahead,” Migration Policy Institute.

¹³ *Daily Sabah* (2016), “Turkey provided health services to Syrian refugees 15.3 million times,” March 29.

¹⁴ See, for instance, Human Rights Watch (2015), “Turkey: 400,000 Syrian Children Not in School: Language, Economic Hardship Keep Young Refugees Out of Class”.

¹⁵ Lorena Rios (2016), “How Turkey’s Syrian refugees are getting by,” *Al Monitor*, March 28.

¹⁶ *The National* (2016), “Turkey allows Syrian refugees to work legally for first time,” January 15.

¹⁷ For a useful discussion of the challenges and the policy responses of Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey, see Alice Beste (2015), “Education in Emergencies: Will Syrian Refugee Children Become a ‘Lost Generation’?” United Nations University.

¹⁸ Gordon Brown (2016), “Without education, Syria’s children will be a lost generation,” *The Guardian*, January 12.

¹⁹ For more information about this initiative, visit: <http://nolostgeneration.org/>.

²⁰ Gordon Brown (2016), “Without education, Syria’s children will be a lost generation.”

²¹ ASAM (the Association for Solidarity with Asylum Seekers and Migrants) is a non-profit NGO partially funded by the UNHCR. Its website can be found here: <http://site.sgdd.info>.

²² Malala Yousafzai, and Muzoon Almellehan (2016), “Syrian children need an education — rich countries must give \$1.4bn to pay for it,” *The Guardian*, January 31.

²³ See, for instance, Sarah Kenyon Lischer (2006), *Dangerous Sanctuaries: Refugee Camps, Civil War, and the Dilemmas of Humanitarian Aid* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press).

About the Presenters

Dr. Bessma Momani has a Ph.D. in political science with a focus on international political economy. She is associate professor at the Balsillie School of International Affairs at the University of Waterloo. She has been a non-resident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC, and a visiting scholar at Georgetown University's Mortara Center and at the Amman Institute.

Dr. James Milner has been a researcher, practitioner and policy adviser on issues relating to refugees, peacebuilding, African politics and the United Nations system. In recent years, he has undertaken field research in Burundi, Guinea, Kenya, India, Tanzania and Thailand and has worked as a consultant for the UNHCR.

Dr. Philippe Fargues is the founding director of the Migration Policy Centre. He is a sociologist and demographer. He has been director of the Center for Migration and Refugee Studies at the American University in Cairo, a senior researcher at the French National Institute for Demographic Studies in Paris and the director of the Centre for Economic Legal and Social Studies in Cairo.

Dr. Kim Rygiel is associate professor in the Department of Political Science at Wilfrid Laurier University and teaches in the Master of International Public Policy Program at the Balsillie School of International Affairs and is also a research associate with Laurier's International Migration Research Centre. Her research focuses on border security, migration and citizenship within North America and in Europe and the Turkish-Greek border.

Archived video of the event is available online at:

<https://youtu.be/A3raNn8j3FQ>

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