

David Last

david.last@rmcc-cmrc.ca

Picking Leaders for Professional Military Education

Deciding who chooses the leaders to shape professional military education, and how they are chosen, is a vital step in building robust military leadership. Whether educational leaders are soldiers, scholars, bureaucrats or some mix has often been the result of cultural happenstance rather than choice. But clear choices are possible.

Abstract

Security sector reform (SSR) rests, in part, on the preparation of new generations of military leadership, which always includes some combination of training, socialization and education. SSR literature focuses on training, but both education and the leadership of professional military education (PME) institutions deserve attention. Drawing on global data, this brief considers trade-offs and choices about military and academic leadership in PME, which every institution must make. It begins by discussing the educational potential of select transitional states, in a comparative perspective. It then explores decisions about military education and choices of leadership in military education, drawing on several institutional cases (not from transitional states, but indicative of choices). It concludes with a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages in the choice of bureaucratic, military and academic leadership within institutions providing higher PME. All institutions of higher education face these choices, and the shifting balance of military, academic and bureaucratic leadership often defines efforts to reform or transform PME. The balance may favour individual leaders capable of bridging the cultural differences between the three types, by combining military and academic virtues with administrative competence.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

David Last is a professor at the Royal Military College of Canada (RMCC) and a Senior Fellow at the Centre for Security Governance. He served for 30 years in the Canadian Army, including command and staff positions in Cold War Germany, and in UN and NATO peacekeeping operations in Cyprus, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Since 2009 the focus of his research has been military and police education, and in 2013 he established an online portal for research collaboration, the Global Security Education Project. In 2016, he was the Fulbright Scholar in Peace and War Studies at Norwich University, Vermont.

Introduction

It is commonplace to discuss PME in the fortunate countries of the West. Education is less commonly discussed in the context of transitional and post-conflict countries. But military and police leaders depend on critical thinking and problem solving to plan and execute tasks beyond the scope of technical training. This demands education. Before addressing the content of education, we should take a step back and consider the leadership of nascent educational institutions, which must adapt and evolve as part of the process of SSR.

This brief is divided in three parts, drawing on an ongoing global study of security education. It seeks to provide evidence-based analysis on PME and suggest ways to improve the development and governance of PME in transitional and post-conflict countries by focusing on three research questions. First, how common is military post-secondary education, globally and in transitional countries? Second, what groups are involved in leading post-secondary or higher PME? Third, how are academic leaders selected, and what are the institutional trade-offs in selecting various combinations of military, civil and academic leadership for institutions providing higher PME?

How Common Is Military Post-secondary Education?

Institutions that strive to provide post-secondary education for military leaders are widespread. They have been evolving for centuries, and have been established and re-established in war-affected countries like Ethiopia, Vietnam, Cambodia and Nicaragua. The shifting balance between training, education and socialization has marked important steps in institutional development. Training transmits specific skills and abilities demanded by known circumstances. Education establishes habits of the mind, including critical thinking and problem solving. Socialization inculcates values, attitudes and beliefs.¹ The three areas are typically combined in every step from recruit training to higher command and staff colleges, with education to prepare for unanticipated circumstances increasing as officers advance through the ranks.² We can see an exponential progression of higher education for military leaders, from a handful of countries with national academies in the eighteenth century to scores of new institutions in the last half century (see Table 1).

Not all of these institutions qualify as universities, but they do all require secondary school completion for entry, and seek to offer education beyond this level.³ Their individual histories are also instructive. Frequently they were established in periods of turmoil or national consolidation, or in response to social trauma or military defeat.

Table 1: National Military Academies, in Order of Establishment

Period	#	Countries (in order of establishment)
17 th Century	1	Italy
18 th Century	7	Denmark, Norway, Austria, Poland, UK, Sweden, Brazil
19 th Century	18	France, USA, Chile, Mexico, Greece, Netherlands, Peru, Turkey, Belgium, Bolivia, Portugal, Serbia, Argentina, Canada, Switzerland, Bulgaria, Spain, Romania
1900-1950	11	Colombia, Russia, Estonia, Mongolia, Uruguay, India, Albania, Korea ROK, Ukraine, Pakistan, South Africa
1951-1990	19	Korea DPRK, Myanmar, China, Egypt, Israel, Cuba, Nigeria, Algeria, Vietnam, Germany, Venezuela, Bangladesh, Tanzania, El Salvador, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Australia, Iran, Jordan
1991-2014	38	Croatia, Latvia, Kenya, Philippines, Finland, Slovakia, Nicaragua, Georgia, Moldova, Tajikistan, Lithuania, Malaysia, Macedonia, Belarus, Ecuador, Paraguay, Hungary, Tunisia, Kazakhstan, New Zealand, Qatar, Uzbekistan, Indonesia, Czech Republic, Saudi Arabia, Honduras, Afghanistan, Uganda, Cambodia, Singapore, Iraq, Kyrgyzstan, Botswana, Togo, Armenia, Madagascar, Zimbabwe, Namibia

Data compiled by David Last (June 2015).

Size, wealth, military expenditure and intellectual infrastructure are important variables affecting the emergence of security education. World Bank data on population, GDP and military expenditure are used for the first three. Intellectual infrastructure implies active universities with the capacity to generate knowledge. Elsevier's SCImago journal and country ranking index of citable documents has been used as a proxy for intellectual infrastructure. For states or territories without reported data (for example, Palestine, Solomon Islands and South Sudan), universities have been evaluated, but this is more subjective than citable documents. Number of citable documents correlates quite strongly with GDP (.93), but less strongly with armed forces manpower (.51) and population (.44).⁴

Using these indicators, and knowledge of existing institutions, we have developed a picture of global security education. Of 216 states and territories, 55 microstates (population under half a million and few or no universities) have limited potential. Of the remaining 151, 113 have established post-secondary military education; a further 13 have the potential to do so; 14 might have the potential; and 21 probably do not, based on a comparison of their characteristics with those that do. Production of citable documents is important, and this correlates inversely with poverty, instability and conflict.

Different lists can be generated from the Global Peace Index (Institute for Economics and Peace), the Fragile States Index (FSI) (Fund for Peace) and the World Bank's list of fragile and conflict-affected states. Several variables within these indices co-vary with difficult transitions: intensity of internal conflict, political instability and internal conflicts fought (Global Peace Index); and high or very high ratings on the FSI security apparatus indicators. Table 2 lists 14 states that recur most frequently (three or more times) across these indicators and indices, as well as 11 fragile and conflict-affected countries based on additional information from the Centre for Security Governance's research on security governance, for a total of 21 states that should be of interest to this audience.

Military post-secondary education is more common than we might expect, even in transitional countries, and is becoming more prevalent over time.

Table 2 shows that 10 of these states already have post-secondary PME. A further four have potential for PME (for example, they routinely engage civilian professors as subject experts for military courses). Seven states seem dubious prospects. Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, DR Congo and Liberia are sufficiently large and wealthy to support PME; lack of higher education infrastructure (column E) is the barrier in these cases. However, Afghanistan's institutions suggest that enough foreign aid can overcome that barrier. The Solomon Islands has no military forces and police officers are trained and educated abroad, mainly in Australia (it may properly belong with the group of microstates mentioned above). Somalia represents a group of states with protracted governance and stability problems that impede the development of institutions.

These findings illustrate that military post-secondary education is more common than we might expect, even in transitional countries, and is becoming more prevalent over time.

Table 2: Potential for PME in transitional and conflict-affected countries

A. Population in millions, World Bank (WB) 2015 [Pop.]

B. GDP in billions, USD, 2014 Constant dollars, WB [GDP]

C. Military expenditure in millions, USD, 2014, calculated from WB % and GDP figures [MilX]

D. Cumulative citable documents produced, 1996-2012, SCImago, Elsevier [Cit.]

E. Date post-secondary military education established (institutional websites) [Est.]

F. Potential for locally owned/developed academic PME assessed [PME]

	A.	B.	C.	D.	E.	F.
Country	Pop.	GDP	MilX	Cit.	Est.	PME
Afghanistan	32.5	19.2	198.6	441	2007	Yes
Albania	2.8	11.5	132.4	1,500	1945	Yes
Bosnia-Herzegovina	3.8	16	162.2	4,336	n/a	Potential
Burundi	11.1	3.1	66.3	273	n/a	No
Central African Republic	4.9	1.5	15	383	n/a	No
Chad	14	10.9	221	266	n/a	No
Colombia	48.2	292.1	9,864	34,768	1907	Yes
DR Congo	77.3	35.2	491.3	332	n/a	No
Iraq	36.4	168.6	13,104.2	5,526	2009	Yes
Liberia	4.5	2.1	13.5	103	n/a	No
Morocco	34.4	100.4	3,268.4	26,175	1945	Yes
Nigeria	182.2	481.1	2,009.1	40,124	1964	Yes
Pakistan	188.9	270	9,634.6	55,915	1947	Yes
Palestine	4.4	12.6	0	Note 1	n/a	Potential
Rwanda	11.6	8.1	93.6	838	2015	Yes
South Sudan	12.3	9	985.2	Note 2	n/a	Potential
Solomon Islands	0.6	1.1	1.4	Note 3	n/a	No
Somalia	10.7	6.0	--	57	n/a	No
Sudan	40.2	84.1	2,858.3	3,860	1948	Yes
Syria	18.5	55.8	2,287.8	3,851	1933	Yes
Yemen	26.8	75.5	3,474.8	1,676	n/a	Potential

Note 1: 14 universities and colleges in the West Bank, 6 in Gaza, high capacity

Note 2: 6 public universities in South Sudan, some capacity

Note 3: 1 college and 1 foreign university campus, low capacity

Decisions about Leadership for Higher PME

If military post-secondary education is widespread, how is it governed and developed? This will affect its ability to prepare leaders who can respond to the security challenges of transitional states.

Military, bureaucratic and academic leaders may vie for influence in the development and guidance of post-secondary PME. Each group has its own process for advancing leaders, and the question of who leads the military

academy and staff college is affected by leadership in government and the security sector. In the abstract model of civilian control, elected civilian authorities appoint the highest military officers and bureaucrats. The highest level usually implies senior officers (colonels and generals), but small armed forces may see political oversight of appointments down to the level of lieutenant colonel or even major.⁵ Academic requirements, however, may introduce a degree of autonomy to the leadership of higher PME.

Promotion within armed forces is typically managed within the uniformed services, by course qualifications and promotion systems based on merit and seniority, although personal connections and social networks play a role in most systems, too.⁶ Realistically, regimental associations, and sometimes

kin-networks or linguistic cabals (often overlapping with regimental or service affiliations), will try to put forward the “best” candidates for command and higher appointments: the “right” people get the opportunities and appointments necessary to advance. Given the opaque nature of command success,⁷ it is hard to say

whether these arcane processes are genuinely meritocratic or represent sophisticated networks of patronage. Nor are the criteria for military success always obvious. Are generals who avoid wars and interventions more effective than those who engage and lose, or even those who win disastrously?⁸

Senior civilian appointments within a ministry of defence may be political, by public service commission, by competition, by seniority and connections, or by any combination of these paths. Both military and civilian appointment processes are open to abuse in almost any country. The merit principle is held up as a standard, and is most easily verified if there are open competitions, transparency in the promotion and appointment criteria, and universal access to the enabling conditions for promotion.⁹ Social networks and personal capital are deployed in competition for appointment and promotion within civilian bureaucracies and military or police forces.

Academic appointments in universities typically reward scholarship, teaching and service to the profession.¹⁰ Research grants and publications, or indicators of academic fame usually define scholarship. The university tradition emphasizes the relationship between a professor and students, so it is rare for administrators to monitor classroom teaching; rather, student evaluations tend to be used to assess teaching. Competent service to committees and leadership roles in the university community usually count heavily in the selection of academic leaders – department heads, program chairs and faculty deans. In the Bologna tradition, students

If military post-secondary education is widespread, how is it governed and developed?

elected masters.¹¹ In the Oxbridge college tradition, faculty members elected masters.¹² Universities are moving toward greater corporate control and regulation in general, but mostly remain self-governing.¹³ Institutional autonomy in a military academy or staff college can create friction with government and the military. Academic leaders in military academies and staff colleges are usually appointed, but the traditions of the university are difficult to separate from academic functions, and appointments are often preceded by searches or other committee processes. Some, like Poland's National Defence University, still conduct decanal elections.

Management research suggests that the diversity resulting from these groups in PME leadership has advantages and disadvantages.¹⁴ It will generate internal tension because of a clash of organizational cultures, but may also serve to keep each group's influence in check, improve decisions, support innovation and enhance institutional performance. It achieves this if diversity is integrated through functional networks of expertise, rather than isolated in hostile camps, and this also hinges on leadership.¹⁵

Including academic study in professional development can also create institutional tensions, but these tensions can be creative.¹⁶ Military academy and staff college commanders are uniformed appointments, and their commands are usually established as units of the armed forces. In some cases, they report directly to a minister of defence, or a chief of defence, while in others they fall within subordinate formations. Public universities, however, typically fall under ministries of education. Military universities with civilian faculty may find themselves coping with an added layer of organizational complexity: collective agreements, academic freedoms and professional accreditation requirements. Frustrating as this may be for commanders, it provides a layer of institutional protection and autonomy, making unilateral changes more difficult, and sometimes more transparent to government and the public.¹⁷ To hire professors, military universities may have to compete with civilian universities, and meet the standards imposed by ministries of education. Although this may be done through a normal civil service hiring process, higher education leaves less scope for direct supervision of the classroom. This raises the question of leadership of the academic component of PME.

Who Leads the Academics?

A university typically includes an academic core and an administrative shell. The normal structure of the core is divided by academic discipline into departments, and sometimes into multidisciplinary programs.

Department heads and program chairs are the inner ring of the administrative shell, with deans and university management above them.¹⁸ The modern history of universities has been one of increasing specialization,¹⁹ diversification,²⁰ globalization²¹ and (by some accounts) declining influence of the faculty in the face of growing managerial control.²² Most public military universities show some evidence of these evolutions. But a different cast of characters governs military universities; they face choices and pressures not evident in civilian universities.

Based on interviews conducted during international seminars on PME and data collected since 2008 in a variety of countries,²³ we can say that a typical military university includes a military training organization, staffed with military officers, and an academic organization, staffed with academically qualified instructors or professors, who may be civilian or military. Like a civilian university, it also has an administrative shell, which may be similarly divided between military and academic management functions. In the case of staff colleges, professors may be integrated into the teaching cadre, and are often paired with senior officers to manage syndicates of staff officers in training. Unlike universities, staff colleges are not segregated by academic discipline. Doctrine development, exercise management and simulation cells usually employ military officers, but sometimes include defence scientists or civilians with special qualifications. Most regularly draw on civilian guest lecturers or specialists.

Beyond this generic description, there is a great deal of variation and evolution across institutions for higher PME. Japan's National Defence Academy has a civilian president, to whom the military commandant is subordinate, although each is master in his own sphere. More common is a military commandant, with a subordinate civilian director of studies, principal or rector. The greater longevity of the latter sometimes confers more power to civilian academics (if only to resist change) than to transitory military leadership. Smaller institutions and staff colleges usually have multidisciplinary teams of academics, selected for the specific contribution that they make to military education. Larger, more university-like institutions offering an undergraduate education, or graduate degrees, may organize professors according to traditional disciplinary boundaries, with departments of history, physics, modern languages and so on.

Selection Processes – Consultation on Executive Decisions

Selection and decision-making processes may be opaque, but the outcome and the authority for the decisions are unequivocal when appointments

are an executive prerogative. Some military academies and staff colleges establish a committee to advise the commandant or director of studies on the appointment of academic leaders. In other cases, permanent bodies that resemble boards of directors or boards of governors are consulted. Consultation may be discretionary, but advisable given potentially conflicting interests served by one appointment or another.²⁴ Consultations may involve pro forma submission of candidates' résumés, public or in camera hearings, calls for submissions or interviews with staff. It seems normal, however, for academic leadership appointments in a military academy or staff college to be command decisions, and usually the result of consensus between military and academic authorities. Academic elections like those of Poland's National Defence University are exceptional. One reason for this is the primacy of the professional education mission, at the expense of other versions of academic freedom.²⁵

Cases of Institutional Leadership Selection

I turn now to two case studies in the selection of academic leaders. The purpose is not to recount the exact details of each case, as this would violate the confidence of the informants. Rather, I present here a discussion combining details from several cases.²⁶ This will serve to illustrate the issues involved in the selection of academic leadership in military academies and staff colleges, particularly those striving to offer degrees or to retain academic accreditation by outside agencies.

The first case concerns the selection of a dean of engineering in a military academy concerned with achieving or preserving professional engineering accreditation. Professional certification is important for countries expecting that their graduates will have civilian employment, or credibility in national development efforts, domestic industry or evaluation of military equipment. However, these hopes can create tension between the research and scholarship necessary for university and professional accreditation, and the professional and technical expertise sought by branches of the armed services. Academics may not like doing administration, and may be happy to have a military engineer take on a leadership role. Once ensconced as department head or dean, however, a military engineer may be more willing to adjust programs for military needs: technical ammunition programs, equipment staffing courses and so on. Academics may worry that they will lose academic credibility, or even university accreditation for their programs, if the course of studies diverges too sharply from the civilian university norm. Engineering accreditation boards (agents of professional engineering societies) may have to be convinced that military courses are the equivalent of those offered in civilian universities, and they are more likely to be convinced by

civilian academics.²⁷

The tension between academic research and scholarship on one side and professional and technical needs on the other can be accommodated if military and academic cultures find individuals to bridge differences. Bridges are most effective when they exist at every level from the classroom to the ministry of education or accrediting body. Accommodation may involve recognizing the academic merit of technical courses or increasing the academic and research component of military courses of study. However, there is no resolution to this tension. Scholars try to improve the academic credibility of military programs, and soldiers try to make them relevant to professional needs.

The second case involves the selection of a dean of humanities in a degree-granting military academy. In this case, competing visions for the role of the institution were on display in the stated intentions of three well-qualified candidates. The appointment took place against a background of resource cuts and threats to the institution, entailing some acrimony between the administrative shell of the military university, and its academic core as the professoriate confronted forced retirements and reduced privileges. Faced with the challenge of overcoming resource shortages, three candidates proposed different strategies for the Faculty of Humanities.

We can consider the challenge of a military university at three levels. The first level involves its place as an institution of national governance and civil-military relations, including the preparation of national leaders. The second challenge involves its place in the armed forces and within a ministry of defence, including the preparation of military leaders as part of a force-generation plan and a personnel-development strategy. As national government becomes well established, and the military instrument is regularized and subordinated to civil authority, the focus of professional military education will shift from the first to the second level. The third challenge involves preserving capacity as a university, and this extends to external relations with the university community, academic governance and faculty-management relations. This third-level challenge may focus on ministry of education rather than ministry of defence requirements.

The first candidate, a civilian with policy experience, proposed a focus on national security: the military academy should seek a wider role in educating civilian leaders for national security, opening up graduate and undergraduate courses to policy analysts, bureaucrats and decision makers.

The second candidate, a military academic, proposed a focus on the force-generation role: the military academy should coordinate the offerings of its academic departments more closely with the military needs of specific branches and services. This might entail teaching communications rather than literature, public administration rather than political science and influence operations rather than psychology, for example. Here we see an echo of the tension between scholarship and professional needs mentioned above; such a focus might entail asking professors to change the content of their courses and research.

The third candidate, a civilian humanities professor, proposed a focus on the core business of the university – academic scholarship and governance. This offered the promise of rebuilding relationships within the military university, which had been strained by shrinkage. There was no guarantee of growing resources to meet the other two candidates' ambitious plans, so the third candidate represented a less risky approach.

Two of these three proposals might be deemed outside the scope of duties for a dean of humanities in a military academy. Yet the position might also be an opportunity for leadership within a national institution, meeting development needs from an academic platform that has more flexibility and potential to innovate than a traditional military staff. The proposals themselves illustrate the utility of academic ambition and autonomy in generating services for national security.

We can contrast these vignettes of academic leadership with examples from a transitional state and an established one – Afghanistan and Malaysia. The National Military Academy of Afghanistan (NMAA) was consciously modelled after the US Military Academy at West Point.²⁸ This model includes mandated curricula and standardized classroom delivery. Military officers provide leadership, although some civilian professors also teach there. Degree programs offered are computer science, management, engineering and Islamic law. The NMAA is one of three institutions constituting the Marshall Fahim National Defence University. The second is an officer training facility modelled on the British Army's Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, and the third is a non-commissioned officer (NCO) training school. The NMAA is listed as a university by the Ministry of Education of Afghanistan, but is not considered a university in international rankings.²⁹ In both the British and American military education models, serving states respectively twice and 10 times as large as Afghanistan, other institutions of higher PME provide scholarly research and scope for military academic interaction, but the models provided to Afghanistan do not.

Malaysia, with a population about the same as Afghanistan, boasts a national defence university and command and staff colleges with innovative academic programs, including a military medical school, and civilian and military faculty engaged in unfettered research and publication. Because of its national “Blue Ocean Strategy” focusing on education, Malaysia has dramatically increased its educational output since 2005.³⁰ Unlike Afghanistan, Malaysia has the capacity to develop national security research in its institutions of higher security education.

Trade-offs – Why Academic Leadership Selection Matters

Decision makers choosing academic leadership for higher PME can emphasize military credibility, academic qualifications and administrative experience, in any combination. The background and experiences of candidates will shape the institution for several generations of students. A typical three-to-five-year renewable term might influence up to a dozen graduating classes. Although every appointee is an individual, we might anticipate advantages and disadvantages with certain recurring patterns, summarized in Table 3 (see Annex I).

For transitional countries, the main advantage of including academic qualifications in the criteria for selection of academic leaders is that it introduces a separate organizational culture, an environment of open enquiry, maximizing the likelihood that academic freedoms will

be observed, and hence that officers will learn to think critically and to treat power with skeptical respect. This is less likely if the subjects studied are limited to doctrinally acceptable technical subjects like management and theological law. Science and engineering, requiring a grasp of scientific method,

will have an impact on critical thinking and problem solving. Social sciences, arts and humanities will have greater impact on the self-reflective and creative capacities of officers.³¹

“...a mix of different types of faculty – military, academic and bureaucratic – will generate effective PME...”

A different system involves political appointment of military leaders to an academy or staff college outside the normal chain of command for military units. Military leadership cohorts associated with cohorts from military academy classes have been implicated in several coups and breakdowns of civil-military relations: Thailand (1981, 1985³², 2006³³); the Philippines; and Korea (1979³⁴). In Turkey, the militant secularism of the officer corps, some in segregated education since secondary, or even primary, school, was linked to repeated interruptions of democratic processes that might bring religious parties to power.³⁵ In Venezuela, a more open education system may have helped military leaders to identify with civilians

suffering from poor governance, thus supporting coup attempts and eventual overthrow of government.³⁶

Table 3 lists six types of PME leadership, from purely military within a normal chain of command, to separated military, military-academic, academic-military, purely academic and civilian bureaucratic. Perhaps the most problematic is the purely military appointment under a separate reporting structure, because it maximizes the potential for coup-prone cohorts of military leaders. Any process making PME responsible to two masters – defence and education – is likely to maximize the creative tension that develops critical and independent officers, well integrated with society. Purely academic leaders may take the institution in directions that military leaders may assume to be irrelevant to security, and this may undermine the long-term health of the institution.

It is probably also true that a mix of different types of faculty – military, academic and bureaucratic – will generate effective PME, even if they fall short of creating the ideal university environment. The individual candidate may be more important than any particular background or preparation. Where are they on the spectrum from flexibility to rigidity? What are the philosophical issues about ways of thinking and knowing that will influence institutional development? What personal characteristics, social capital and leadership skills do they bring to the job? But the best possible candidates will be frustrated if they are not accepted and supported by the institution: institutional perception and organizational culture will shape the potential of the individual.

Conclusion

This brief has made three points. First, post-secondary military and paramilitary education is increasingly common, even in transitional states. Post-secondary military educational institutions are inevitably hybrids of military, academic and bureaucratic organizational cultures. Secondly, the leadership within these institutions can come from military, academic or bureaucratic cultures. Thirdly, there are different selection processes, and distinct advantages and disadvantages of leadership from each category. The vignettes of selection for a dean of engineering and a dean of humanities in some typical military academies illustrate some of the idiosyncratic factors that might be germane at a particular time and place, when academic processes prevail in a military environment.

By examining the history and the different trajectories and models of governance and development for professional military education in

transitional, fragile and conflict-affected countries, this brief used new evidence and data on PME globally to provide a framework and reference point for innovative debates and discussion on the role and usefulness of military education in the context of security sector reform programming and security governance more broadly. It also framed the fundamental issue of selection of academic leadership in military academies and staff colleges through an extensive mapping of options for PME leadership selection, highlighting that a mix of different types of faculty – military, academic and bureaucratic – will likely generate effective PME.

Notes

1. Kratcoski, Peter C. and Dilip K. Das. 2007. *Police Education and Training in a Global Society*. Plymouth, UK: Lexington Books.
2. Wakelam Randall. 2015. "Learning for War: Militaries as Learning Organizations" In *Armed Forces for 2020 and Beyond: Roles, Tasks, Expectations*, edited by Walter Feichtinger and Benedikt Hensellek. Vienna, Austria: Schriftenreihe der Landesverteidigungsakademie, 275–276.
3. Constantineau, Philippe and David Last. 2015. "Long-Term Evolution of Professional Military University Education," *International Journal of Education and Social Science*, 2:9.
4. Last, David, David Emelifeonwu and Philippe Constantineau. (work in progress). Global Security Education Project, based on World Bank and SCImago data.
5. Consider military appointments in Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, or Jamaica, for example.
6. Barany, Zoltan. 2012. *The Soldier and the Changing State: Building Democratic Armies in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Americas*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012, chapter 1.
7. Hackett, J.W. 1983. *The Profession of Arms*. London: MacMillan. Hackett begins with a vignette about a successful weak leader and an unsuccessful strong one, illustrating the inscrutable nature of leadership.
8. Tuchman, Barbara. 2011. *The March of Folly: From Troy to Vietnam*. London: Random House.
9. Public service commissions in many OECD countries publish guides and periodic reviews of promotion in public service, and the OECD publishes regular reviews of public sector integrity.
10. Lombardi, John V. 2013. *How Universities Work*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
11. Haskins, Charles Homer. 1923. *The Rise of Universities*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
12. Snow, C.P. 1951. *The Masters*. London: Penguin. A novel based on the politics involved, by a man who was at times both a Cambridge don and a civil servant.
13. Boffo, Stefano, Pierre Dubois and Roberto Moscati. 2008. "Changes in university governance in France and in Italy," *Tertiary Education and Management* 14, no. 1: 13–26.
14. Jackson, Susan E., Aparna Joshi and Niclas L. Erhardt. 2003. "Recent research on team and organizational diversity: SWOT analysis and implications." *Journal of Management* 29, no. 6: 801–830.
15. Reagans, Ray and Ezra W. Zuckerman. 2001. "Networks, diversity, and productivity: The social capital of corporate R&D teams," *Organization Science* 12, no. 4: 502–517.
16. Last, David. 2015. "Irritants to Pearls: Military Education, Epistemic Communities, Communities of Practice and Networks of Learning," In *Armed Forces for 2020 and Beyond: Roles, Tasks, Expectations*, edited by Walter Feichtinger and Benedikt Hensellek. Vienna, Austria: Schriftenreihe der Landesverteidigungsakademie, 231–254.

About the SSR 2.0 Briefs

These short peer-reviewed briefs present forward-looking, policy-oriented analysis and recommendations on pressing SSR and related issues. They cater to a wide audience, including policy-makers, practitioners, researchers, academics and general observers. The series offers a venue to present new ideas, approaches, and strategies. Authors are encouraged to adopt innovative positions and break new ground in their briefs.

Series Editor – Mark Sedra

Series Coordinator – Antoine Vandemoortele



Centre for Security Governance

85 Edwin St., Unit 1

Kitchener, Ontario

N2H 4N7

Canada

Phone: 226-241-8744

Email: info@secgovcentre.org

The Centre for Security Governance (CSG) is a non-profit, non-partisan think tank dedicated to the study of security and governance transitions in fragile, failed and conflict-affected states. Based in Canada, the CSG maintains a global, multi-disciplinary network of researchers, practitioners and academics engaged in the international peace and security field.

17. Economic historian Douglas Allen describes the importance of independent measurement of performance in tax collectors and the Royal Navy. Allen, Douglas W. 2011. *The Institutional revolution: Measurement and the Economic Emergence of the Modern World*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
18. Lombardi, John V. 2013. *How Universities Work*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press; Rosovsky, Henry. 1990. *The University: An Owner's Manual*. New York: W. W. Norton.
19. Abbott, Andrew. 2001. *Chaos of Disciplines*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
20. Kerr, Clark. 2001. *The Uses of the University* (fifth edition). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
21. McBurnie, Grant and Christopher Ziguas. 2007. *Transnational Education: Issues and Trends in Offshore Higher Education*. London: Routledge.
22. Ginsberg, Benjamin. 2011. *Fall of the Faculty*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Note that this is based on American university experience. For a European perspective, see Ruegg, Walter (ed.). 2003. *A History of the University in Europe: Universities since 1945* (Volume IV). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
23. Original data (2009-2015) for this brief include interview data from international seminars (Serbia, 2009; Botswana, 2011; Brazil, 2012; Indonesia, 2014) with informants from more than 40 countries and thick descriptive data from site visits (2008 – Netherlands, Mongolia; 2009 – Serbia, Croatia, Israel, Palestine; 2010 – Japan; 2011 – Botswana, South Africa; 2012 – Brazil; 2014 – Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia; 2015 – Finland, Norway) and ongoing work with RMCC and CFC in Canada during that period.
24. Lombardi, *How Universities Work*, p. 168: "The process of university governance involves a wide range of complex negotiations, meetings, and consultations, all designed to buffer conflicting interests."
25. Stanley Fish describes a spectrum of five different positions on academic freedom, from "it's just a job" at one extreme, to "advocating revolution" at the other. Military universities are usually at "just a job" end of the spectrum, with the emphasis on academic, not on freedom. A motto might be, "We're here to defend democracy, not to practice it!" Fish, Stanley. 2014. *Versions of Academic Freedom*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
26. RMC Research ethics board decision, January 2014, informed by Sweeney, L. 2002. "Achieving k-anonymity privacy protection using generalization and suppression," *International Journal of Uncertainty, Fuzziness and Knowledge-Based Systems*, 10, no. 5: 571-588.
27. Credibility of the messenger consistently emerges as a key determinant in knowledge transfer. Mitton, Craig, Carol E. Adair, Emily McKenzie, Scott B. Patten and Brenda Wayne Perry. 2007. "Knowledge transfer and exchange: review and synthesis of the literature," *Milbank Quarterly* 85, no. 4: 729-768.
28. Hanif, Hila. 2010. "Afghanistan's 'East Point' Military Academy," US European Command, [Guest blog](#), September 17.
29. Cybermetrics Lab, a research group belonging to the *Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas* (CSIC), the largest public research body in Spain, produces annual rankings of the world's universities.
30. Last, David. "Security Education in Malaysia," [Global Security Education Project](#).
31. Finn, Peter. 2015. *Critical Condition: Replacing Critical Thinking with Creativity*. Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press; Brookfield, Stephen. 2012. *Teaching for Critical Thinking: Tools and Techniques to Help Students Question Their Assumptions*. San Francisco, CA: John Wiley and Sons.
32. Neher, C.D. 1992. "Political succession in Thailand," *Asian Survey*, 32, no.7: 585-605.
33. Pathmanand, Ukrist. 2008 "A different coup d'état?" *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 38, no. 1: 124-142.
34. Croissant, Aurel. 2004. "Riding the tiger: Civilian control and the military in democratizing Korea," *Armed Forces & Society*, 30, no. 3: 357-381.
35. Kaplan, Sam. 2002. "The politics of military secularism and religious militarism in Turkey following the 1980 coup," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 34, no. 1: 113-127.
36. Norden, Deborah L. 1998. "Democracy and military control in Venezuela: from subordination to insurrection," *Latin American Research Review*, 33, no. 2: 143-165.

Annex I

Table 3: Summary of Options for PME Leadership Selection

Type of Leadership	Selection Process	Advantages	Disadvantages	Institutional Example
Purely military, normal unit in command structure	Appointment of available officers by chain of command	Can be directed to service priorities; Reinforces socialization of faculty and students.	Socialization may be unhealthy or support cliques and elites; Short rotations limit personal influence, but also constrain development.	Colonel as dean, Lieutenant Colonel as program chair
Military under direct report, separate institutional status	Political appointment, or gift of senior officer (may involve demonstration of loyalty or affiliation)	Military leaders may be insulated from training focus and career pressures; Special status acknowledged; May preserve autonomy, emphasize national purpose.	May generate a coup threat from cohesive cohorts of leaders with a sense of entitlement; May reinforce and replicate authoritarian government.	General as rector, colonel as dean, reporting to minister of education Military leaders have special relationship with ministry of defence, other departments, senior political leaders
Military-academic	Appointment of military officer with academic credentials, may require career development to ensure availability	Bridges two cultures; Ensures military needs met; Minimum impediment to academic development of institution.	May have minimal academic credibility; May leave little room for academic improvement; Risk of status disequilibrium (senior scholar, junior officer).	A colonel with an MA may be preferable to a captain with a PhD - usual military promotion criteria apply

Academic-military	Selection process for academic appointment, in which military credentials count	Puts academic credibility first, but ensures bridge of cultures	May fuel culture wars within the institution; Usually limited to modest scholarship (time, dual career pressure)	Modest scholarship, administrative competence, and prior service count; a major with a PhD may be preferable to a colonel with an MA
Civil service	Public service commission or independent panel, may involve open call or selection of internal candidates	Oversight of probity with civil service rules; Focus on management and administration competence; May be important to get financing, build institution within larger government structure.	May satisfy neither military nor academic objectives; May introduce third culture with consequent loss of internal cohesion.	Committees, courts, and bureaucracies as alternative forms of civil service leadership
Pure academic	Selection process for academics, with no credit for military credentials	Enhances academic credibility; Injects scholarship; Useful for recruiting upwardly mobile outsiders.	May become militarily irrelevant; problem of disciplines (what focus? what to exclude?); Small scale precludes doing everything.	A civilian university is contracted to provide military education Institution stands on academic merit