

CSG PAPERS

The Gradual Emergence of Second Generation Security Sector Reform in Bosnia-Herzegovina

Branka Marijan

Funding for this project was provided by
The Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA)





CREDITS

Mark Sedra

Series Editor

Antoine Vandemoortele

Series Coordinator

James Bisch

Graphic Designer

Jennifer Goyder

Copy Editor

About the CSG Papers

This peer-reviewed paper series provides a venue for comprehensive research articles and reports on a variety of security sector reform and related topics. It endeavors to present innovative research that is both academically rigorous and policy relevant.

Authored by prominent academics, analysts and practitioners, the CSG Papers cover a range of topics, from geographic case studies to conceptual and thematic analysis, and are based on extensive research and field experience. Most CSG Papers are products of research projects undertaken by the Centre for Security Governance and its partners.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

4	About the Project
6	About the Author
6	Acknowledgements
7	Executive Summary
8	Acronyms & Abbreviations
9	Introduction
11	Alternative Approaches to SSR
20	Crafting a Second Generation SSR Model
25	Conclusion
29	Notes
30	References

ABOUT THE PROJECT

This paper is the product of a multi-year CSG research project, titled *Exploring the transition from first to second generation SSR in conflict-affected societies*. Led by CSG Executive Director Mark Sedra, the project assesses and evaluates the impact of orthodox security sector reform (SSR) programming in conflict-affected countries. Employing a common methodology, the project features original research on four case study countries: Bosnia-Herzegovina, El Salvador, Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste. The case study countries chosen each feature two broad characteristics: they are recovering from conflict and making transitions from war to peace; and they are mature cases of SSR, in that they have been subjected to at least ten years of externally supported SSR programming of some form. It is also important to note that geographical diversity played an important role in case study selection, with four distinct regions represented— Balkans, Central America, West Africa, and Asia-Pacific.

The SSR model as it is applied in war-to-peace transitions and broader state building projects is in the midst of a period of change. Over a decade of case study analysis, particularly in conflict-affected environments, has shown that the SSR model, as outlined in formative documents like the *OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform*, has had a meager record of achievement. A survey of key SSR implementation cases demonstrates a distinct conceptual-contextual gap. The principal tenets and features of the SSR model, like its holistic character, focus on governance, and human security orientation are rarely translated into practice in conflict-affected SSR settings. It can be argued that the SSR model in its fundamental form has never actually been applied as designed in conflict-affected environments, prompting many scholars and practitioners to explore new approaches seen as more viable in difficult implementation settings. This thinking is often loosely grouped under the heading of second generation SSR, involving a move to a new, more contextually attuned reform approach. This second generation SSR discourse is still nascent and ill-defined but rapidly taking form and gaining momentum.

The dominant objective that has united the still disparate second generation SSR thinking is the imperative of narrowing the conceptual-contextual gap. This discourse has already spawned some ad hoc programmatic initiatives in conflict-affected settings, often revolving around notions of empowering non-state security and justice providers as a means to build more sustainable and locally legitimate reform outcomes, or employing interim stabilization measures to help shape conditions for more conventional SSR interventions. In spite of the SSR model's mixed record, SSR stakeholders and observers are not calling for its jettisoning, but rather a refashioning of the model's core methods and good practices to make it more applicable in conflict-affected environments.

This project seeks to contribute to the gradual shift or transition in SSR policy and practice, through comparative analysis of four prominent conflict-affected SSR cases. By investigating the impact of conventional SSR and tracking entry-points for alternative approaches, the project aims to generate innovative, evidence-based insights and practical recommendations to improve SSR policy and programming in conflict-affected contexts. Importantly, the project will provide a detailed evidence base on how SSR has been applied to transform the security and justice architectures of states making war-to-peace transitions. The project will ascertain what works and does not work in the application of the orthodox SSR model, and by extension if and how a second-generation SSR approach could deliver better results in conflict-affected environments.

As already mentioned, alternative or second-generation SSR initiatives are already emerging organically in many reform contexts, thus part of the purpose of the project will be to identify these instances and investigate whether they can inform changes to the wider SSR model. On a broader level the project seeks to advance constructive dialogue on the future of the SSR model, which has come under increasing scrutiny and pressure among policy-makers, practitioners and analysts in donor and recipient states alike due to its mixed record of achievement in conflict-affected environments.

The project seeks to answer the following main research questions for each case:

1. To what extent and how have SSR efforts followed the orthodox SSR model as described in the *OECD-DAC Handbook on SSR*? In assessing SSR efforts in each case study country, how have orthodox SSR approaches succeeded and failed and why?
2. What alternative approaches or entry-points for security and justice development programs are available? Are they used, and if so, how? If not, why?

The project has produced two reports per case study country—eight in total—one for each of the aforementioned research questions. The final report of the project—the ninth in the series—will synthesize the results of the case study research, drawing conclusions about the efficacy of orthodox SSR approaches and the potential for second generation SSR ideas.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Dr. Branka Marijan is a researcher specializing in security sector reform and peacebuilding. She is a Program Officer at Project Ploughshares in Waterloo, Ontario. Branka completed her PhD at the Balsillie School of International Affairs at Wilfrid Laurier University. Her dissertation focused on uncertain peace that persists in post-conflict societies long after peace agreements have been signed. Her broader research interests include state building, police reform, civil-military relations and disarmament.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Funding for this project was provided by the Folke Bernadotte Academy.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Bosnia's security sector reform (SSR) has largely been shaped by dominant approaches to peacebuilding and statebuilding. Orthodox approaches have contributed to the important rebuilding of Bosnia's security framework, but have fallen short of fully transforming the security governance in the country. Importantly, given the imposing international presence in designing and carrying out the SSR agenda, there are concerns about the sustainability of the reforms given the lack of local ownership. In response, local and international SSR experts suggest there is a need to move away from state-centric, top-down orthodox approaches to the more flexible, bottom-up approaches of the second generation SSR model. However, second generation approaches to SSR remain nascent in Bosnia. This is, in part, a result of the lack of political will of local and international actors to undertake ambitious reforms given Bosnia's relative stability and maturity as a post-conflict country. But it is also due to continuing tension between the decentralizing model of security governance resulting from the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement and the centralizing model favoured by the international community over the last 15 years. Indeed, a key criticism of SSR in Bosnia has been the politicization of SSR and its uses as an instrument of statebuilding. This paper points to some possible entry points for the development of second generation SSR, such as community policing and wider civil society engagement; however, it acknowledges that empowering local actors is no simple task as there are great power imbalances and little incentive for senior officials to accept these changes in approach. In addition, the top-down nature of the peacebuilding process in Bosnia has served to disempower local actors. Ultimately, the paper suggests that a second generation approach to addressing remaining gaps in SSR in Bosnia might involve working within existing political frameworks rather than using SSR as a political tool.

ACRONYMS & ABBREVIATIONS

CIN	Centre for Investigative Reporting
CSS	Centre for Security Studies
DFID	Department for International Development
EU	European Union
EUPM	European Union Police Mission
ICT	information and communication technologies
IPTF	International Police Task Force
NGOs	non-governmental organizations
OHR	Office of the High Representative
RS	Serb Republic (Republika Srpska)
SDC	Swiss Agency for Development and Co-operation
SSR	security sector reform
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

INTRODUCTION

Second generation approaches to SSR remain nascent in Bosnia-Herzegovina. While there is a growing recognition in Bosnia among domestic and international SSR specialists and practitioners that there needs to be a movement away from orthodox approaches, significant challenges remain.

A second generation approach to SSR is understood here to be less ideological, and more accepting of bottom-up approaches and non-state actors, norms and structures in security governance and provision. In comparison, orthodox approaches are top-down, state-oriented, and often more reflective of donor preferences than those of the local actors (see Sedra, 2015). Over the past 20 years, Bosnia's peacebuilding and statebuilding experience has largely been shaped by more orthodox approaches. Indeed, the international community played a dominant role in Bosnia's SSR process by designing, implementing and carrying out the reforms, with local actors being perceived as recipients of international blueprints. The first paper in this series examined the application of orthodox norms and principles to SSR in Bosnia and assessed the effectiveness of these efforts. Before discussing the potential second generation approaches, a summary of the findings of the first paper is provided, noting the advantages and flaws of the orthodox model.

Following Bosnia's 1992-1995 war, the security sector was divided along ethnic lines with parallel institutions created by each of the three main communities. As such, a key aim of the initial reforms was to address the legacy of the war and dismantle the parallel security institutions. As the initial reforms were carried out, international actors, such as the Office of the High Representative (OHR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, sought to bolster the weak central authority. The 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement created a highly decentralized state, which complicated the governance of the security sector. Post-Dayton Bosnia is comprised of two entities, the Bosniak-Croat Federation and the Serb Republic (RS), as well as the special status Brcko District. In addition, the Bosniak-Croat Federation is further divided into 10 cantons. As such, statebuilding in Bosnia, and particularly as it relates to security governance, has been focused on creating more centralized institutions. Over time, this goal became tied to Bosnia's aspirations for European Union (EU) membership, as a strengthened central state in control of security institutions is perceived to be more ready for EU membership.

Orthodox SSR approaches have led to important rebuilding of Bosnia's security framework. However, the orthodox approaches were ultimately not successful in fully transforming the security sector and fell short of ensuring greater centralization of security institutions, a key goal of the internationally supported SSR agenda. On the one hand, the defence sector reform and the creation of a state-level Ministry of Defence have been important developments, as are centralized institutions in other key areas, such as intelligence and

border control. In addition, the police and defence forces were downsized, certification programs for police and judiciary were carried out, and international support for training programs has contributed to the professionalization of military and police personnel. On the other hand, the stalled reforms of the police and judiciary illustrate the limits of externally driven reforms. In other words, the push for centralization of security institutions in the deeply divided country with a highly decentralized Dayton-structured security sector has been seen as politicizing the SSR process. In other words, SSR has been used as an instrument of statebuilding by, for example, seeking to reduce the power of the entities and cantons over policing. This, in turn, resulted in pushback from some local elites, notably representatives from the RS and, to a lesser extent, the Croat politicians. This has led to serious concerns about backtracking on judicial reforms and the consolidation of the reforms that have already been achieved. The heavy-handed international presence, while necessary given the absence of domestic consensus on the reforms, has brought forward questions regarding the sustainability of the reforms, as well as the issue of local ownership. It is precisely the concerns with the sustainability, as well as the need for more local ownership, that have been pointed to by domestic and international SSR experts as necessitating second generation SSR programs.

However, a key challenge for the development of second generation approaches is the tension between Bosnia's decentralized system of security governance as outlined by the Dayton Peace Agreement and the more centralizing approaches favoured by the key international actors in Bosnia, such as the OHR and the European Union. As such, more flexibility and acceptance of ad hoc approaches that are reflective of second generation SSR are then also not easily reconcilable with donor preferences. Moreover, while international actors recognize and often voice the need to include, for example, civil society representatives in oversight mechanisms, this is more of a tweaking of orthodox approaches to SSR than a movement toward actual second generation approaches. As a result, what emerges from the Bosnian case is more of an SSR 1.5, where the aim is to include more civil society engagement rather than to accept non-state actors as security providers.

This tweaking of dominant approaches to SSR in the country is also representative of the lack of political will among both domestic and international actors for a more ambitious second generation program. More than 20 years after the signing of the Dayton Agreement, and given Bosnia's relatively stable security environment, there is little appetite amongst international and local elites to enact significant changes in their approach to security governance. For the most part, the recent challenges to stability in Bosnia have come from the socio-economic sphere rather than political or military spheres. While the constant threat of a referendum on the question of the Serb Republic's independence is present and discussed by the Bosnian Serb leadership, it has not been carried out. However, in 2014, significant street protests brought forward the socio-economic grievances shared

by the population including high unemployment levels and widespread corruption. Still, the protests have not recurred and while the Bosnian political reality is best described as muddling along, there is little incentive for local or international actors to undertake new approaches to SSR. As such, any movement toward second generation approaches to SSR is dependent on the ability to persuade local and international elites in the country of the need for an alternative approach rather than simply accepting the status quo.

Against this background, this paper provides an exploration of the possible emergence of second generation SSR ideas in Bosnia. It provides some entry points for discussion of alternative SSR approaches. Alternative approaches are labelled as such as they diverge from the orthodox SSR model by engaging civil society in security governance. Namely, the paper highlights developments in the area of community policing, albeit a donor-initiated project, and its subsequent adoption by certain local actors as one possible way to address the concerns with sustainability of reforms and gaps in local ownership of the SSR process. In addition, the increased engagement of civil society actors in the security sphere, as well as the wider community, through new technologies, also points to a possible development beyond orthodox approaches. However, much remains to be done and these are only initial shifts. Importantly, a challenge for these alternative approaches is the great power imbalance that exists between community champions and civil society actors and the security institutions of the state. Ultimately, the paper suggests that a second generation approach to SSR should also consider how best to improve the efficiency and accountability of security institutions within existing political structures. This would address the key criticism of the orthodox SSR approach in Bosnia that used SSR as a political tool to transform the decentralized Dayton structures. In assessing Bosnia's SSR, the paper draws on academic literature, policy reports and research interviews conducted in Bosnia in September 2013 and July-August 2015, with local and international experts and practitioners, as well as civil society members.

ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO SSR

While there has not been a significant move away from orthodox SSR approaches, several projects and initiatives have been launched that aim to build closer ties between local communities and the security establishment, to increase public trust in security institutions such as the police, and engage civil society organizations to provide oversight and monitoring of reforms. While these initiatives remain largely dependent on donor funding and support, many have been carried out in partnership with local civil society organizations, such as the Sarajevo-based Centre for Security Studies (CSS). Indeed, there is some evidence pointing to growing engagement of civil society, and not just elites, in the SSR process.

Community Policing

The projects promoting community policing offer an instructive view of potential second generation approaches to SSR. Community policing philosophy was introduced early on in the police reform process by the United Nations and continued with the European Union Police Mission (EUPM). The EUPM eventually focused most of its energy on other aspects of the reform process (Blaustein, 2014a: 48). Other international actors took the lead on community policing, most prominent among them being the UK Department for International Development (DFID), the Swiss Agency for Development and Co-operation (SDC) and later on the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) (ibid.). The CSS has also participated in community policing initiatives in partnership with Saferworld. As Andy Aitchison (2007: 336) notes, the involvement of these domestic and international civil society actors is important as it signals a “shift from wholly state-focused assistance.”

The philosophy of community policing was a new idea in the Bosnian context, given the history of the police in the former Yugoslavia. Prior to the outbreak of the 1992 war, the police in Bosnia was perceived to be the “extended hand” of the communist regime (Deljkic and Lucic-Catic, 2011: 176). As such, there was no model of community policing in Bosnia.¹ Following the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995, police involvement in human rights violations committed during the war meant that there was a great need to rebuild public trust in the police. Community policing is seen as appealing by external actors as it is a way to provide legitimacy to the police following violent conflict and has been exported to diverse post-conflict contexts (Baker, 2008: 40). From 1996 to 2002, the International Police Task Force (IPTF) led the police reforms and introduced the concept of community policing to Bosnia. During this time, all Bosnian police officers were required to attend a training course on community policing (Deljkic and Lucic-Catic, 2011: 176). From 2003 to 2005, the EUPM continued the focus on community policing by further introducing the concept across all the police stations in Bosnia (ibid.). However, as Irma Deljkic and Marija Lucic-Catic (2011: 176) point out, the EUPM community policing project was only partially successful. As they explain, in some police stations, community policing was still not well understood and taken to mean more “friendly police officers” (ibid.). As a result, the top-down approach employed to introduce the concept, first by the IPTF and then by EUPM, meant that much remained to be done to further embed the philosophy of community policing.

Around the same time that the EUPM was providing support for community policing, other international organizations also developed their own projects on this theme. In contrast to the broader introduction of community policing across the board by the IPTF and the EUPM, international organizations worked closely with selected police services to further entrench the concept. For example, one of the earliest projects on community policing was carried out by UK’s DFID in the municipalities of Prijedor (in the RS) and

Zepce (in the Federation) (Deljkic and Lucic-Catic, 2011: 177). The selection of these two municipalities was important as they were representative of the two entities and the range of challenges that Bosnia faced following the conflict, such as inter-ethnic and communal tensions as a result of wartime atrocities (Deljkic and Lucic-Catic, 2011: 177; Aitchison, 2007: 336). These particular municipalities were seen as difficult cases for the community policing philosophy, thus any success achieved would bode well for wider implementation (Aitchison, 2007: 336).

Interestingly, as Aitchison (2007: 336) highlights, the pilot projects featured two important dimensions, which pointed to a more holistic approach to security provision. The first focused on the police services and provided officers with key skills and knowledge. The second looked beyond the state institutions, and sought to involve the local communities. This was done through consultative groups and crime audits as well as allowing the community to identify other security concerns around minority returnee safety (ibid.). Ultimately, the goal was to have these two dimensions lead to a review of lessons learned that would then be introduced to the different ministries (ibid). What was particularly novel about this approach was the goal of including community input as part of the project and having these community concerns shape the police priorities (ibid). This reflected the DFID view on the necessity of including civil society actors in the SSR process.

In its police reform programming, DFID endeavoured to highlight that the state was the key provider of security and had a responsibility for the security institutions (ibid.). Indeed, the goal was to have the ministries implement the necessary changes based on the experiences of the officers and the community. The community input was crucial, and for the Bosnian context represented an important shift from the typical top-down reforms of the security sector carried out by the OHR, the United States, the European Union and other international actors. What set the DFID initiatives and those of similar organizations apart from the work of the IPTF and the EUPM was that the latter were internationally mandated and had direct access to executive power (ibid., 337). This means that the work of DFID was slower, but it was also more flexible, and allowed for greater relationship and trust building with the local communities. Community policing was one of three areas that DFID focused on, the other two being a project offering strategic assistance to the entity-level police ministries and a set of pilot projects on judicial reform.

Around the same time, the SDC also became involved in community policing. In 2004, the SDC had carried out a pilot project on community policing in Zenica, a town in the Zenica-Doboj canton (Hvidemose and Mellon, 2009: 3). The project was then scaled up to the cantonal level in 2005 and included the municipality of Doboj, which is located in the RS. There was some delay in participation from RS authorities in Doboj, and the project started in the spring of 2006. According to Deljkic and Lucic-Catic (2011: 178), the pilot project revealed that there was support for the notion of community policing and that it

simply required further support and development. The pilot project also revealed that the problem of domestic violence was significant and needed further attention by the police services as well as other community organizations.² As such, community policing and the building of trust between citizens and police were seen as having a very positive impact, allowing the police to develop a better understanding of the issues facing the community. It also brought together the police and different community organizations to at least start cooperating on finding ways to tackle domestic violence.

Another project that advanced the idea for more bottom-up reform was developed by the SDC in the Sarajevo canton. As Jarrett Blaustein (2014a: 4) highlights, the SDC focused on a “micro-level community policing model.” According to Blaustein (2014a), what set the SDC approach apart from earlier efforts, particularly those of the IPTF and the EUPM, was the view that community policing should be carried out by officers assigned to specialized community policing units. The rationale behind this approach was that these specialized officers would demonstrate the usefulness of the approach to their colleagues and supervisors (*ibid.*: 14). Among local participants, this became known as the Swiss model, as it was indeed based on the “best practices” of community policing from that donor country (*ibid.*: 5).³ However, the model became applicable in the Bosnian context because it focused on low-ranking officers and it empowered them to become norm entrepreneurs in their stations. As Blaustein (2014a: 8) notes, this embracing of the agency of the officers was particularly useful in promoting cultural transformation of policing norms.

Interestingly, in his analysis of two different units in the Sarajevo canton, Blaustein (2014a) also identifies several other factors that shaped the development of the Swiss model of community policing. In his examination of the implementation of the SDC projects, Blaustein highlights that one of the units was more successful in promoting community policing. Officers in the successful unit were able to apply the model in a culturally sensitive way and recognized that it was up to them to interpret the external model (see Blaustein, 2014a: 12-14). They sought to show the relevance of the model by contributing to the work of their colleagues and by sharing the knowledge learned from their engagements with the community. They were also well-educated and younger. In addition, this unit had robust support from its leadership, which allowed it to carry on with the project even when it was difficult to demonstrate positive impacts (*ibid.*: 11).

The second unit was less successful due to several challenges, including its location in the city centre. The location meant that those selected for the community policing project frequently ended up working on additional assignments due to budget constraints. This, in turn, prevented them from establishing the same rapport with the community that the first unit was able to build (*ibid.*: 15). The second unit also did not have the same support from management and included veteran officers who were not as interested in new approaches to their work (*ibid.*). Moreover, the group had the perception that

their colleagues did not take them seriously; thus, instead of trying to demonstrate the effectiveness of their efforts, they tended to adopt a defensive posture (*ibid.*). They simply did not buy into the model and the new norms it espoused.

Beyond the unsuccessful unit, community policing projects in Bosnia have generated concerns from local stakeholders. One of the key concerns is that much of this work is project-based.⁴ Once the projects are completed, there is a lack of funds to further integrate the new norms and practices into local police culture. Without the necessary resources, local security experts are in agreement that the projects will not be sustainable and will not spread across the country. Another challenge is that the Swiss model, by virtue of the fact that it features a small number of specialized officers in dedicated units, can foster problems with knowledge transfer and institutional memory. When an officer in a community policing unit is promoted or leaves, gaps in knowledge and experience tend to emerge (Blaustein, 2014a: 14). As such, the sustainability of these efforts can be challenged. As Aitchison (2007) notes, these micro projects are also sensitive to the greater police restructuring attempts by the OHR and the EU. In other words, the bottom-up approaches are vulnerable to major structural changes by elites, both domestic and international.

Some of these concerns are visible in relation to the development of local security forums. In 2003, DFID and the SDC introduced “citizen security forums” to compliment the community policing projects (Blaustein, 2014b: 303). The aim of the forums was to provide another way for the police to engage with the community and allow them to start addressing local security concerns (*ibid.*). However, by 2009, the donors had stopped or were withdrawing their financial support of the forums (*ibid.*). Recognizing the value of the forums, the UNDP’s Small Arms Control and Prevention team put together a proposal to ensure the continued support for five forums (*ibid.*). These included forums in Bratunac, Prijedor, Sanski Most, Visegrad and Zenica. The UNDP approved the project allowing the Small Arms Control and Prevention team to provide some funding, including the salary for an in-house community policing adviser (*ibid.*). In addition, a small grant from the Danish government was provided to support the operation of the forums. The UNDP team then worked with the forums to develop their administrative capacities (*ibid.*). Still, the dependency on donor funds remains an ongoing concern. The UNDP (2015) continues to champion the development of the security forums, launching new pilot projects in the municipalities of Mostar, Bijeljina and Prijedor. In the case of Mostar, the UNDP is working with local officials to develop a 2016-2020 operational security plan, which includes the formation of citizen forums. Whether these citizen forums become self-sustainable remains to be seen. More research is needed to examine the role of the citizen security forums and their contribution to security governance in the country.

Indeed, a central critique of efforts to export the community policing model and its various

aspects, such as the community forums, to conflict-affected countries holds that there is little evidence showing that such approaches are effective (Baker, 2008). In practice, it is not clear what elements of the community policing model are actually useful. There are also important concerns that this is yet another export of Western norms to contexts where they may not be viable. Moreover, introducing community policing models while simultaneously advancing systemic police reforms may be too ambitious (ibid.: 40). In most recipient countries, the adoption of the community policing approach is dependent on the work of junior officers, who often lack the “decision-making authority” and even basic levels of capacity (ibid.: 39). This concern is not insurmountable, though the support of the police leadership level is critical as there are significant power imbalances between the junior officers and the senior officials and state institutions. Bruce Baker (2008: 40) notes that the success of community policing is dependent on wider reforms of policing and, crucially, the effectiveness of the justice sector. As he rightly notes, the police often face criticism from the communities when there is a perceived failure to prosecute and jail criminals, even if it is a result of the shortcoming of the judiciary rather than the police.

Despite these challenges, the dual engagement of police and communities in Bosnia offers important insights for approaching future SSR initiatives in Bosnia and beyond. By empowering individual police officers, the DFID and the SDC recognized the agency of frontline police, not just their superiors, in implementing reforms. International donors also allowed frontline police to “localize” the process, to use their local knowledge to adapt and contextualize the community policing philosophy. In peacebuilding projects, and SSR in particular, donors often focus on elite interests and elite-level agreements, prompting the employment of reform strategies and models that do not reflect the local context or serve the interests of local communities (Berg, 2012: 5). However, the bottom-up approach in community policing sought to be more inclusionary and go beyond the elites, embracing citizen engagement. Moreover, the appreciation of the agency of local actors meant that local actors were able to take ownership of the process. As highlighted earlier, the norm entrepreneurs were predominantly well-educated, younger officers who adopted the newer philosophy and adapted it to the local context. The support of their management was important, but they were also keen to demonstrate the relevance of their approach to policing. As such, the community policing project reveals that the SSR process has to involve a wider array of local actors, and to focus on building bottom-up change, hallmarks of the second generation approach. Still, whether the community policing model is accepted more widely in Bosnia remains to be seen. Some of the challenges to the export of community policing are not specific to the Bosnian case, but rather are visible across different cases (Baker, 2008: 40). In general, further study and more empirical evidence of the community policing projects are needed as they could inform important shifts in SSR orthodoxy (ibid.). At the same time, a broader question of how to provide incentives for senior officials to accept more bottom-up approaches remains relevant for

the success of programs such as community policing and the move toward more second generation approaches.

Civil Society Involvement

Over time, international donors, including the European Union, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the UNDP, among others, have also sought to encourage wider participation of civil society in the monitoring of the security sector. Civil society development and support is a key part of the liberal peacebuilding agenda and the SSR concept; a plethora of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) sprang up in Bosnia following the war as international funds poured in (Caparini, 2005; Belloni, 2001). As critics have pointed out, most of these organizations were disconnected from the local populations and focused more on donor preferences. Many were also established to exploit the influx of aid and were short lived as donor attention turned to other conflict zones (Caparini, 2005: 82). While international actors were keen to engage civil society in other areas of peacebuilding, the SSR process was initially focused on technical aspects and institution building. Still, as the reforms unfolded, the OHR and other international organizations wanted to engage civil society groups in the oversight, monitoring and functioning of the security sector. Much of this effort has been ad hoc, looking for organizations that can be institutional partners, often as a form of box ticking to demonstrate local ownership. However, there is also a growing recognition of the need for practical involvement of local communities to provide oversight and to monitor security institutions. Moreover, and perhaps more interestingly, international and domestic NGOs have also sought to influence the SSR process and have been able to find innovative entry points and methods to engage with the security sector. For instance, some Bosnian NGOs and civil society members have used social media to monitor the activities of the police and call attention to the corruption of different state institutions.⁵

The involvement of civil society in the security field is relatively new in the Bosnian context (Caparini, 2005). Much like the community policing project, the inclusion of non-state actors in the field of security is novel. Bosnian government officials tend not to be receptive to the involvement of civil society actors in security issues, instead drawing on internal experts or international actors when creating new policies (ibid.: 82). However, it was the donors who pushed for civil society involvement with somewhat mixed results. The number of NGOs that have the necessary expertise and interest in the security sector is small. This is partly a result of the “projectization” of civil society work in the area, denoting the heavy reliance of civil society actors on donor-funded projects that do not always support sustained attention to issues (Perry, 2015). Still, the focus by donors on engaging the civil society did contribute, albeit slowly, to a shift in perspectives on the

engagement of non-state actors in the security field.

Some of the projects focusing on greater civilian involvement were aimed at building bridges between state institutions and civil society organization. For example, the UK government contracted Atos Consulting to provide support for the involvement of community organizations in the state-level Ministries of Justice and Security (Worner, 2009: 16). The goal of the project was to work with both ministry officials and civil society groups to develop capabilities and identify areas where mutual engagement would be most useful. However, the project was not able to nurture wider civil society involvement in the work of the ministries for a number of important reasons. Crucially, the key functions of the Ministries of Justice and Security include harmonization and coordination of the different security and rule of law institutions in the country, as well as international cooperation (ibid.: 18). As such, it is difficult to find suitable partner organizations in civil society, as most of these are focused on grassroots, bottom-up issues rather than high-level policy and coordination (ibid). For local organizations, the issues that they are concerned with are within the jurisdiction of the entity, or the cantonal and municipal governments, not the state (ibid).

However, the project did make some headway in some areas. For example, the Sector for Immigration of the Ministry of Security cooperated with civil society organizations to find safe houses for victims of trafficking (Worner, 2009: 18). In 2005, the Sector for Immigration approached local NGOs to help it address this issue – five organizations responded and in 2007 another organization was brought on board (ibid.). The local organizations are empowered to help and offer confidential medical and psycho-social assistance to victims of human trafficking (ibid.). In addition, the Ministry of Security works with the legal aid network, Vasa Prava, to ensure that individuals in safe houses have access to legal aid (ibid.). As Jane Worner (2009: 19) shows, cooperation between civil society and the ministries was regarded as pragmatically necessary by both parties. For the ministries and the civil society groups, the key benefit of the greater cooperation was that it brought them forward on the EU Accession agenda. Civil society organizations also agreed that their involvement was a positive step for the community and that everyone would benefit from the greater engagement. Once again, though, a lack of resources has proven to be a barrier as the continued cooperation requires financial support and staff time (ibid.: 19-20).

Still, a few civil society groups and representatives have found ways to engage with the SSR process. Most visible have been research organizations such as the CSS and the Atlantic Initiative. In addition, the NGO Žene Ženama (Women to Women) has focused on gender issues related to the security sector. The success of these groups stems, to a large degree, from their networking abilities and donor project support. While this reliance on donor support is less than ideal, it has contributed to some capacity building among local

groups.

This engagement of civil society organizations in the SSR process is particularly visible on the issue of anti-corruption. The CSS, for example, has cooperated with the Ministry of Interior in the Sarajevo canton to develop an online tool that would allow citizens to report corruption (Dnevni Avaz, 2015). The government's partnership with the CSS on this project sends an important signal about the importance of cooperation between civil society organizations and the police. Alternative media outlets have also played an equally important role in bringing the corruption challenge into the light. The Centre for Investigative Reporting (CIN), an independent media agency, regularly investigates instances of corruption in all sectors of the government.⁶

Bosnian civil society activists regularly turn to social media platforms, such as Twitter and Facebook, to share their concerns about different security institutions, most often the police. These comments often focus on everyday public grievances, such as the uneven enforcement of parking and traffic laws by the police officers, or different forms of corruption and clientelism across the security and justice sectors. However, it is difficult to measure whether these social media activities are having an impact on the behaviour of the security institutions or if they are even paying attention to them, although there have been several reports of police in Bosnia, particularly in the RS, searching the apartments of activists who have been critical of political elites and institutions (see Buka, 2016). While the use of social media as a form of oversight in the security sector is typically spontaneous and not organized, it represents an important platform to engage the public, particularly the youth, on SSR issues.

Over the past few years, Bosnian citizens have used social media to organize protests as well as to respond to emergencies, such as natural disasters. The power of social media was especially visible in 2014 when Bosnians took to the streets to protest state corruption and the lack of economic opportunities in the country. Citizens used social media platforms to share information about the protests, strategize and organize follow-up protests. Interestingly, the police response to the protests was also tracked with information about mistreatment of protestors during their time in custody widely shared on Twitter and Facebook.

The protests saw the emergence of "citizens' plenum" or open meetings where attendees could speak and share their concerns. This was seen as further evidence of the changing nature of social and political engagement in the country (International Crisis Group, 2014: 3). However, the plenums have faded away and have not had the transformative impact on Bosnian politics that some had expected, but their importance should not be completely disregarded as the plenums did present a "novel institutional framework" and one that citizens had organized themselves (*ibid.*). Also in 2014, when floods hit parts of Bosnia, many citizens used social media to organize their efforts and provide aid and

assistance to the most affected regions (Boračić-Mršo, 2014). In this case, individuals and groups coordinated their efforts over Facebook, filling a gap in governance, as Bosnia's institutions were slow to react to the crisis.

Despite these encouraging examples, greater involvement of civil society largely depends on donor support and funding. This reliance on external assistance means that the focus on the security sector by some organizations is not sustainable. Simply, civil society actors are forced to follow funding from sector to sector, which could create funding gaps in the monitoring of the security institutions. Another challenge, as Marina Caparini (2010: 252) notes, is that the organizations that are consulted and partnered with are policy-oriented and may not be "well-rooted in the society." In other words, the staff are not necessarily representative of the broader society and may not have links to the community. Caparini (2010: 252-253) clarifies that is not to say that these organizations do not play an important role, but rather that there is a need to include the broader community, particularly the more marginalized segments. The availability of social media has provided another avenue for engagement but it remains underutilized by wider society, civil society organizations and government institutions. Moreover, social media use is not without drawbacks as individuals have used these platforms in ways that have undercut the work of police and other security actors rather than advance their reform. This includes, for example, the broadcast of the location of police traffic checks.⁷ More importantly, civil society engagement, whether in community policing forums or through social media activism, is also faced with the same issue of power imbalances between these individual and the senior officials and state institutions.

CRAFTING A SECOND GENERATION SSR MODEL

The alternative approaches to SSR taken in the Bosnian case highlight the need for a flexible and responsive second-generation SSR model. This section outlines a second generation SSR agenda that draws on the Bosnian experience and focuses on greater engagement of local actors and communities. Indeed, any second generation approach to SSR should empower local actors and allow them to translate proposed donor norms and practices into locally meaningful and impactful reform programs. This may, at times, result in the emergence of hybrid structures that were perhaps not originally envisioned by donors, but may be more suitable to the local context (see Mac Ginty, 2011). This hybridity is not without its own problems and careful thought should be given to the dilemmas that this literature brings to the surface (Donais, 2015). Namely, as Timothy Donais (2015: 228) notes, "the extent to which any actor, or set of actors, is capable of exercising ownership amid the complexity and contingency of peace-building contexts." This does not mean that international actors should not engage with local actors and the domestic political context. Quite the contrary, international donors should provide long-term support and

guidance for SSR processes, but in a contextually attuned manner. Furthermore, the importance of the Bosnian political context in shaping donor approaches shows that SSR does not occur in a vacuum in conflict-affected environment. The success of SSR is shaped by other peacebuilding activities and should be seen as part of that wider agenda (Andersen, 2011: 10).

An important point to highlight is that alternative approaches to SSR in Bosnia have sought to strengthen or improve the functioning of state institutions. While non-state actors in the form of civil society organizations are involved, security provision ultimately remains the responsibility of the state. This is not simply an imposition by the Western donor countries, but is rather an expectation of the local population.⁸ As such, the case does not feature alternative security providers, such as paramilitaries or other non-state structures. There are also no specific traditional structures or approaches to peacemaking, such as, for example, the Gacaca courts in Rwanda. Moreover, while ethnic elites continue to struggle for control over various security institutions and the Bosnian political system is complex, the Bosnian state is relatively stable. In that sense, the second generation approach to SSR that emerges from Bosnia is ultimately focused on greater local ownership of the necessary reforms and involvement of the community in holding state security institutions and actors to account. A second generation approach would then also mean that the focus on remaining gaps in SSR, such as police and judiciary reform, should work within existing decentralized political structures to improve efficiency and accountability, rather than to use SSR as a means of transforming Bosnia's political structures.

Mark Sedra (2015: 172) identifies three schools of thought on the future of the SSR model: monopoly, good enough and the hybrid. The monopoly school highlights the need for more institution building and greater commitment of donors. The good enough school calls for more interim measures while accepting the current condition of the state. The hybrid school is the most critical and sees the need for more indigenous approaches and recognition of local approaches to peacemaking. The second generation SSR that emerges from the Bosnian case could be described as a *hybridity-lite* approach.⁹ The hybrid school of thought asserts the need for more authentic local ownership of the peacebuilding project. It recognizes that more traditional approaches are better suited to the local context than imposed institutions and norms. As such, a second generation SSR process in Bosnia needs more local ownership and greater civilian oversight of the security sector. As Roger Mac Ginty and Oliver Richmond (2016: 225) point out, this inclusion of the local should not be taken to mean “enabling external trusteeship via ‘native’ (that is, friendly local) administration and power-holders.” Instead, the agency of the local population should be central to the peacebuilding agenda. At the same time, the Bosnian case can be seen as *hybridity-lite* as much of the remaining work in SSR is ultimately about bolstering state institutions, albeit through a more inclusive role for non-state actors. As such, the paper outlines a proposed second generation approach that draws on the Bosnian experience.

To begin with, the alternative approaches employed in Bosnia show that the SSR process should be shaped by a more inclusive approach, involving a diverse actors set of actors, including mid-to-low level security professionals and NGOs. These actors should be engaged to identify and develop responses to pressing issues and challenges. Rather than donors approaching them with already crafted models, actors' input should be employed to craft contextually appropriate strategies. Bosnia has competent security professionals who have, over the past two decades, worked closely with international actors and agencies. These individuals understand the local context better than external experts and have the necessary skills and knowledge to design effective reform programs. However, they are often not consulted and donors often approach them to rubber stamp already developed agendas.¹⁰ Moreover, any concerns that these individuals raise with the proposed plans are ignored, particularly if they are seen as “foot soldiers” rather than higher-ranking officials.¹¹

NGOs are also central in supporting, monitoring and advocating for greater accountability of the security sector. As orthodox SSR is inherently state-centric, NGOs are often brought in late in the process, after major transformations have occurred. Involving these organizations much earlier on and not simply as observers is crucial. There should be several streams of civil society involved. The role of NGOs is important, as is forming a local expert community that includes civil society, academics and journalists focused on the security sector. This local expert community could play a vital role in monitoring reforms and tracking progress. While this type of knowledge community often emerges organically, they are concentrated in major cities and few have access to key security sector institutions. Donors play an important role in ensuring that this type of civil society engagement is included in the SSR process. In many countries, engaging non-state actors in security provision is novel and donors can support their inclusion by leveraging their financial support.

At the same time, civil society engagement should go beyond formal organizations and experts. Community forums, for example, provide an opportunity for the police and citizens to interact and address security concerns at the grassroots level. These community-level initiatives are often more relevant to the everyday life of the population and are more likely to bring together a wider group of citizens. Individual citizens are more likely to see the value of participating in community-level consultations than national-level policy processes. The establishment of “citizens' plenum” forums, similar to those that emerged during the Bosnian protests, provide one medium for individual citizens to bring forward issues of concern within their neighbourhoods and towns. The forums could generate grassroots solutions to security and justice challenges that could be scaled up to the regional and state levels.

New technologies allow for the engagement of a wider cross-section of the community in

the monitoring of the security institutions. In their examination of the role of information and communication technologies (ICTs) in post-conflict reconstruction, Tim Kelly and David Souter (2014) suggest that ICTs could increase transparency and accountability. They go as far as to state that, “The opportunity exists now, through ICTs, to make public participation part of the culture of governance, including transparency and accountability, rather than a supporting mechanism for stabilization” (Kelly and Souter, 2014: 26). Some of the possible ways to engage citizens in security governance is to crowd-source information on the issues in their communities as well as to conduct opinion polls through mobile phones (ibid.). As Kelly and Souter note, this data should then be used not only by governments, but also civil society organizations and media, among others. However, they caution that despite their great promise, these new technologies are still plagued by issues of representation. Some groups, such as women and minorities, might be worried about the consequences of their involvement (ibid.). Another concern is that the data could be manipulated by elites to suit their own purposes. In conflict-affected environments, ethnic groups could use their group’s dominance of a particular area to their advantage, at the cost of the security of the minority groups. For example, in consultations on changes to laws and other governance issues, ethnic minorities might be fearful to voice their opinion, particularly if it is critical of security institutions such as the police. As such, the views and preferences of the dominant ethnic group would continue to shape the political context in that particular region or area. In addition, many conflict-affected countries lack the infrastructure for widespread use of this technology.

Another feature of an emergent second generation SSR model should be that local actors have the ability to choose, adapt and even dismiss external models or standards. This proposition is not without some problems. In their analysis of SSR processes in Timor-Leste, Liberia and the Palestinian Territories, Ursula C. Schroeder, Fairlie Chappuis and Deniz Kocak (2014: 227) highlight three varieties of hybrid security governance: normative shells, ceremonial structures and capacity improvements. Normative shells include instances where the norm was supported but there was no follow-through on implementation. Similarly, ceremonial structures point to structures that were created but remain symbolic. Finally, capacity improvements resulted in operational capacity being improved, but democratic standards fell by the wayside. At times the models and standards that are being exported vis-à-vis SSR may not be making much of a difference in particular contexts. The question then is whether these standards and norms should be promoted in the first place.

However, not all external models or approaches are irrelevant. In the case of community policing in Bosnia, donors were keen to promote their models of community policing. In the case of one unit in Sarajevo, these models were interpreted and implemented by individual officers. In the case of Zenica, the focus on community policing uncovered the prevalence of domestic abuse that might have otherwise remained hidden. This interplay

between donor ideas and the local implementation is evidence of hybridity. Moreover, even if the concept of community policing was new in the Bosnian context and introduced by the donors, this does not mean that it is automatically an imposition or unsuitable to the local context. In Bosnia, there were aspects of community policing that were regarded with skepticism by local police officers. For example, as one senior police officer points out, “This idea of police officers engaging in activities with the public, take youth for example, is great and we need more engagement. But some of the ideas for this engagement, such as police officers going to the movies with the youth, is simply not suitable.”¹² However, the police representatives interviewed felt that community policing was needed and should be made relevant to the local context.

Furthermore, the Bosnian case also offers a valuable lesson about the uses of SSR as a political instrument. While the push for centralization by international actors made sense in relation to some institutions, such as the Ministry of Defence, it has proven to be more controversial in relation to police reform. Defence reform and the creation of a common military were necessary steps in the efforts to build peace in the country and prevent a return to conflict. After all, if the three main ethnic communities maintained their own militaries the security situation in the country would be more unstable as there would be even greater mistrust between the former warring parties. However, centralization and the goal of creating EU-ready institutions was more problematic when used in relation to police reform for two reasons. One, it entailed using police reform as a way to reduce the power of the sub-units of the states rather than to improve the accountability of the police forces and to improve the overall functioning of policing. Two, some EU countries also have quite decentralized institutions in policing and there is no single European standard for governance of policing. Then it became clear that some actors, particularly the OHR, had perceived police reform as yet another instrument to use in attempts to overcome political division in the country. A more hybrid approach to remaining gaps in SSR should then accept the decentralized political structures and work within them to improve the functioning of different security institutions. Whether such an approach would be more effective remains to be seen.

The second generation approach to SSR outlined above highlights the need for the SSR field to ensure more local ownership of reforms through the involvement of civil society organizations as well as the wider community. The problematique of local ownership is often discussed in the academic literature as well as policy papers (Donais, 2008; 2015). There is a general agreement among academics and practitioners that while it often receives rhetorical support, in practice it has often been missing. Timothy Donais (2015: 229) points to two issues that need further consideration. First, local ownership can lead to outcomes that are not in line with the standards of “good governance” promoted by the donors. As such, there is a tension between the commitments to international norms and to local ownership. Donais (2015: 229) notes that in some cases, accepting “illiberal

practices” may be what donors have to do. In other words, there should be recognition that some approaches may not suit the visions of the donors, but are more reflective of the local context and should be accepted.

However, this does not mean that there should not be certain norms and standards that are non-negotiable. Donors have resources that give them leverage and allow them to support minority rights and rights of women, for example, that are common challenges in post-conflict countries. Second, Donais highlights an on-going concern that local ownership is reserved for elites and that there is a disconnection between the elites and the masses. Some of the suggestions provided here regarding more inclusive ways to engage the broader public as well as civil society organizations through community forums and new ICTs start to address this concern. But more attention needs to be paid to the context-specific ways that the broader community could be engaged and to ensure that local populations have the means to hold elites to account.

As such, second generation approaches should address the main weaknesses of the orthodox model. Namely, the need to go beyond top-down approaches and elite-level interventions to meaningfully engage local civil society organizations and the broader community. Crucial here is the notion of meaningful, as the involvement should encompass more than merely the buy-in of local actors to already designed agendas, but rather their active involvement in shaping those agendas. This focus at least provides possible ways to address the issue of imposed reforms and the sustainability of these reforms. As Safal Ghimire (2016: 13) observes, input of local actors is necessary to “legitimize” SSR as well as to avoid creating a disconnection between international and local perceptions of the security environment. Moreover, a hybrid approach to SSR would entail that external actors also be more accepting of the political realities on the ground and not politicize the reforms.

CONCLUSION

Further reforms and consolidation of previous reforms of the security sector will continue in Bosnia. However, given the lack of international pressure and political will to intervene in the domestic context, any future reforms will occur at a much slower pace.¹³ Moreover, donor funds for SSR have already decreased and this trend is likely to continue. Still, donor projects, such the 2014–2019 justice project by USAID, worth some US\$9.4 million, shows that there is still some donor commitment to SSR in Bosnia.¹⁴ The key unresolved issue of police restructuring and judiciary reform will be the main focus of future SSR efforts. The RS government’s attempts to rollback reforms in the judiciary will be a major concern for international and local SSR stakeholders, including the OHR and the European Union, moving forward.

The European Union, in particular, will be working with Bosnian institutions and elites to improve security governance in the country. In February 2016, Bosnia formally applied for EU membership and the European Union has made it clear that this is only a first step and that Bosnia must follow through on many reforms, including in the judiciary (Baczynska, 2016). Chapters 23 and 24 of the conditions for EU membership deal specifically with the security sector and judiciary. Interestingly, shortly before the Bosnian government announcement, Bosnians were caught by surprise when they discovered that the state government had adopted a legal mechanism to coordinate the EU integration process (Latal, 2016). In previous years, the various ethnic leaders could not agree on the coordinating mechanism and the process was stalled. The lack of transparency regarding the adoption of the mechanism was criticized by local political analysts who saw this as more proof of the disconnection between the elites and the population (*ibid.*). More problematically, EU representatives had been “engaged in intensive negotiations” regarding the mechanisms with local elites (*ibid.*). As such, some analysts, such as Jasmin Mujanović (2016), have questioned the European Union’s willingness to confront the ethnic leaders in Bosnia, and see the European Union as “complicit in their rule.” It remains to be seen whether the European Union will be more engaged with Bosnian political dynamics and how it will advance the SSR process. Particularly interesting given these latest events will be the commitment to greater civil society oversight and community involvement in SSR.

In many ways, the Bosnian case is better suited for the orthodox SSR model than other post-conflict countries. Much of the institution-building and technical aspects of the orthodox model were necessary in the aftermath of the Bosnian war. The local context was also receptive to the state-centric approach as security governance is considered by the citizens to be the responsibility of the state. Bosnia also does not have more traditional approaches to dispute resolution or peacemaking. However, even in this more receptive context, orthodox SSR and liberal peacebuilding approaches displayed significant shortcomings, as the implementation of the reforms depended on the intrusive role of the OHR. This has meant that in order to achieve some of the reforms envisioned, the stakeholders of the liberal peacebuilding agenda resorted to illiberal practices. Crucially, international actors politicized the reform of the security sector and used SSR as a tool to transform the decentralized, Dayton-created structures, into more centralized, EU-ready structures. In this way, SSR was then used to attempt to take back power from the entities and to thus address the ethnic divisions in the country.

The first generation approaches to SSR in Bosnia were, in part, necessary due to the divided domestic political context (see also Berg, 2012). Without an intrusive international presence, many of the reforms that have been achieved would likely not have happened. Due to the top-down nature of the reforms, state-level security institutions were created, such as the Ministry of Defence. At the same time, the full reform of the police and

judiciary was unsuccessful. Moreover, as the international community become more reluctant to intervene in local politics, some of the reforms achieved, for example, in the justice sector, have been eroded. The move of the international community to step back from reforms highlighted how political parties in the country were seeking to maintain factional control over security institutions (ibid.: 23). In regard to the extent of the international involvement in SSR and statebuilding, the Bosnian case is particularly notable for the attention it received. However, the SSR process was still based on short-term projects and goals. The domestic political context requires longer-term involvement and a focus on the structural issues that contribute to domestic political incentives (ibid.). In addition, not enough attention was paid to the need to empower local communities and to encourage them to engage in oversight of the security sector. A state-centric, top-down strategy to SSR needs a complimentary bottom-up approach (see Gordon, 2014).

As such, the Bosnian case does inform the developing second generation SSR model. It shows the need for more flexible responses and greater involvement of the local community. Empowering local actors to take on certain reforms and projects is crucial as was visible in the community policing projects. Including civil society is also key and there should be more focus on developing expert communities amongst civil society.

In Bosnia, domestic political factors have constrained the development of the SSR process and will likely continue to do so. While there are no quick-fix solutions for the remaining challenges, there are ways to move the process forward. For example, instead of tackling policing in a country-wide manner, more incremental changes can be pursued at the entity levels. This could involve streamlining the different administrative tasks and putting in place mechanisms for cooperation. At the same time, other efforts could focus on the RS police and working with the wider community to develop more effective and responsive policing. Such a focus would shed light on the extensive influence of political elites on operational policing in the RS. Additional training and work with judges and prosecutors to improve standards and effectiveness should be carried on despite the political struggles over the judicial reforms. The European Union should continue to monitor developments in the judiciary and apply pressure on local political actors to advance reforms. This would be a movement away from attempts at greater centralization and would reflect an acceptance of the existing frameworks.

Another critical issue, given the extensive international role in Bosnia's SSR process, is the sustainability of the reforms. For instance, in the military, more work remains to be done at the lower ranks where battalions are still divided by ethnicity. This separation of the battalions by ethnicity means that the integration achieved at other levels is potentially reversible (see Krebs and Licklider, 2015/2016: 123).

Therefore, there should not be a one-size-fits-all model or formula for SSR, a key tenet of second generation SSR. What works in Bosnia may not be suitable in other contexts. In

fact, as noted earlier, in many ways the Bosnian context is more receptive to orthodox SSR approaches than other conflict-affected countries. Still, the uses of SSR as a political tool to transform Bosnia's decentralized political system has proven to be problematic. As such, a more flexible second generation SSR model that can accommodate and adapt to existing political structures is more viable and desirable. While some may argue that a more fragmented SSR approach could exacerbate some of the damaging disconnects prevalent in the Bosnian security sector, a more adaptable second generation SSR model could be precisely what is needed to address persistent challenges. Finally, a lesson that should be learned from the Bosnian case for second generation approaches to SSR is the need to empower local actors early on in the peacebuilding process. Applying second generation approaches is that much harder when there has been some 20 years of top-down orthodox approaches that have for the most part disempowered the local population.

NOTES

1. There is some debate about this, see, for example Smajovic and Piracha (2013). The general point from those disputing the lack of community policing in Bosnia is that prior to the war, the police were involved in the communities and sought to engage in preventive action. However, given the political context, much of this interaction would have been guarded as anything said to the police that could have been perceived as critical of the regime would have had consequences. As such, I would argue and most scholarship agrees that it is correct to say that the concept of community policing that emerges following the end of the war is new to the Bosnian context.
2. Personal communication with police representative Sarajevo, September 13, 2013.
3. Personal communication, civil society representative Sarajevo, September 11, 2013.
4. Personal communication with police representative Sarajevo, September 13, 2013.
5. Much of this monitoring of, for example, police activities is done by local activists on platforms such as Twitter and Facebook. Some NGOs, such as Centri Civilnih Incijativa, regularly update their Facebook pages with information on corruption in the country. There is also evidence of spontaneous monitoring of security institutions, particularly the police, by individual citizens who share pictures and information on these platforms when they observe or experience activities that are not in line with the law.
6. CIN was established in 2004 with the support of a USAID grant and continues to be funded through grants from international donors. See www.cin.ba/en/about.
7. For example, a Facebook group, "Policija Zaustavlja- Banja Luka," has updated information on police traffic checks in Banja Luka, RS. It is unclear whether the police authorities in the RS are aware of this group.
8. Personal communication with a non-governmental organization representative, Sarajevo, July 28, 2015.
9. See Roger Mac Ginty (2011) for a discussion of different liberal peacebuilding approaches. Mac Ginty points out that in some cases, such as Northern Ireland, there is a soft touch approach that is not as coercive as in some other cases, such as Bosnia. This paper suggests that a similar lite approach to hybridity exists as it not fully based on accepting non-state actors as security providers, but can nonetheless involve greater civil society engagement.
10. Interview with legal professionals, Sarajevo, July 29, 2015.
11. Ibid.
12. Personal communication with police representative Sarajevo, September 13, 2013
13. As one international bureaucrat interviewed in Sarajevo on September 10, 2013 points out, for international actors, "There is no sense of urgency. There is also no commitment to the longer-term, it is hard to sell back home."
14. The project aims to provide technical assistance, training and mentoring to prosecutor's offices. See USAID (2016) for more information.

REFERENCES

- Aitchison, Andy (2007). "Police Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina: State, Democrac and International Assistance." *Policing and Society* 17, no. 4: 321-343.
- Andersen, Louise R. (2011). "Security Sector Reform and the Dilemmas of Liberal Peacebuilding." Danish Institute for International Studies Working Paper 31. Available at: www.ciaonet.org/attachments/19721/uploads.
- Baczynska, Gabriela (2016). "Bosnia applies to join EU, but has a long road ahead." Reuters UK, February 15. Available at: <http://reut.rs/1VfYOnd>.
- Baker, Bruce (2008). "Community Policing in Freetown, Sierra Leone: Foreign Import or Local Solution?" *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 2, no. 1: 23-42.
- Belloni, Roberto (2001). "Civil society and peacebuilding in Bosnia-Herzegovina." *Journal of Peace Research* 38, no. 2: 163-180.
- Berg, Louis-Alexandre (2012). "Guns, Laws and Politics: The Domestic Foundations of Rule of Law and Security Sector Reform." *The Hague Journal of Rule of Law*, 4, no. 1: 4-30.
- Blaustein, Jarrett (2014a). "Community policing from the 'bottom-up' in Sarajevo Canton." *Policing and Society, Online First*: 1-21.
- (2014b). "Reflexivity and Participatory Policy Ethnography: Situating the Self in a Transnational Criminology of Harm Production." In *Reflexivity and Criminological Research*, edited by Karen Lumsden and Aaron Winter. Pages 301-312. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Buka (2016). "Policija brutalno pretukla prijedorskog aktivistu Nikolu Kuridžu!" August 25. Available at: www.6yka.com/novost/112137/policija-brutalno-pretukla-prijedorskog-aktivistu-nikolu-kuridzu.
- Boračić-Mršo, Selma (2014). "Lice i naličje društvenih mreža." *Radio Slobodna Evropa*, December 6. Available at: www.slobodnaevropa.org/content/lice-i-nalicje-drustvenih-mreza/26728877.html.
- Caparini, Marina (2005). "Enabling Civil Society in Security Sector Reconstruction." In *Security Governance in Post Conflict Peace Building*, edited by A. Bryden and H. Hänggi. Geneva, Switzerland: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces.
- (2010). "Civil Society and the Future of Security Sector Reform." In *The Future of Security Sector Reform*, edited by Mark Sedra. Pages 244-262. Waterloo, Ontario: CIGI. Available at: www.cigionline.org/publications/future-security-sector-reform-0.
- Deljkic, Irma and Marija Lucic-Catic (2011). "Implementing community policing in Bosnia

- and Herzegovina.” *Police Practice and Research: An International Journal* 12, no.2: 172-184.
- Dnevni Avaz (2015). “Aktivirana aplikacija za online prijavu korupcije” January 30. Available at: <http://www.avaz.ba/clanak/161241/aktivirana-aplikacija-za-online-prijavu-korupcije?url=clanak/161241/aktivirana-aplikacija-za-online-prijavu-korupcije>.
- Donais, Timothy (2008). *Local Ownership and Security Sector Reform*. Zurich: Lit Verlag.
- (2015). “Ownership: From Policy to Practice.” In *Handbook of International Security and Development*, edited by Paul Jackson. Pages 227-247. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Ghimire, Safal (2016). “Making security sector reform organic: infrastructures for peace as an entry point?” *Peacebuilding*, FirstLook: 1-20.
- Gordon, Eleanor (2014). “Security Sector Reform, Local Ownership and Community Engagement.” *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development* 3, no. 1.
- Hvidemose, Dorte and Jérôme Mellon (2009). “Monitoring and evaluation arrangements for the implementation of community policing in Bosnia and Herzegovina: a case study.” Saferworld. Available at: <http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/382-bosnia-case-study>.
- International Crisis Group (2014). “Bosnia’s Future.” Available at: www.crisisgroup.org/-/media/Files/europe/balkans/bosnia-herzegovina/232-bosnia-s-future.pdf.
- Kelly, Tim and David Souter (2014). “The Role of Information and Communication Technologies in Postconflict Reconstruction.” Washington, DC: The World Bank. Available at: <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/16679/9781464800740.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>.
- Krebs, Ronald R. and Roy Licklider (2015/2016). “United They Fall: Why the International Community Should Not Promote Military Integration after Civil War.” *International Security* 40, no. 3: 93-138
- Latal, Srecko (2016). “Bosnians Stunned by Secret Adoption of EU Legislation.” *Balkan Insight*, February 10. Available at: www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/adoption-of-bosnia-s-new-eu-coordination-mechanism-sparks-controversy-02-10-2016-2.
- Mac Ginty, Roger (2011). *International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance: Hybrid Forms of Peace*. Basingstoke, Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Mac Ginty, Roger and Oliver Richmond (2016). “The fallacy of constructing hybrid political orders: a reappraisal of the hybrid turn in peacebuilding.” *International Peacekeeping* 23, no. 2: 219-239.

Mujanović, Jasmin (2016). "Bosnia-Herzegovina's EU Candidacy: Symbolic or Substantive." European Council on Foreign Relations Commentary, February 23. Available at: www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_bosnia_herzegovinas_eu_candidacy_symbolic_or_substantive_6011#.

Perry, Valery (2015). Constitutional Reform Processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Top-down Failure, Bottom-up Potential, Continued Stalemate. In *State-Building and Democratization in Bosnia and Herzegovina*, edited by Soeren Keil and Valery Perry. Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate.

Sedra, Mark (2015). "Transitioning from First to Second Generation Security Sector Reform in Conflict-affected Countries." In *Handbook of International Security and Development*, edited by Paul Jackson. Pages 165-180. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing.

Schroeder, Ursula C., Fairlie Chappuis and Deniz Kocak (2014). "Security Sector Reform and the Emergence of Hybrid Security Governance." *International Peacekeeping*, 21, no.2: 214-230.

Smajovic, Kenan and Awais Piracha (2013). "Can the Universal Concept of Community Policing be applied in Different Jurisdictions? A Cross-comparative Analysis of Policing in Sydney, Bosnia and New York." Paper presented at the State of Australian Cities Conference, Queensland, Australia, November 29. Available at: www.soacconference.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Smajovic-Social.pdf.

UNDP (2015). "Development of Operational Security Plan Starts in Mostar." Available at: www.ba.undp.org/content/bosnia_and_herzegovina/en/home/presscenter/articles/2015/09/08/u-mostaru-po-ela-izrada-operativnog-plana-sigurnosti.html.

USAID (2016). "Fact Sheet: Justice Project in Bosnia-Herzegovina." Available at: www.usaid.gov/news-information/fact-sheets/fact-sheet-justice-project-bosnia-and-herzegovina.

Worner, Jane (2009). "Supporting Civil Society Engagement in the State Ministries of Justice and Security, Bosnia and Herzegovina." *Western Balkans Security Observer* 12: 15-25.

The Centre for Security Governance (CSG) is a non-profit, non-partisan think tank dedicated to the study of security and governance transitions in fragile, failed and conflict-affected states. Based in Canada, the CSG maintains a global, multi-disciplinary network of researchers, practitioners and academics engaged in the international peace and security field.

WWW.SECGOVCENTRE.ORG

Centre for Security Governance

85 Edwin St., Unit 1
Kitchener, Ontario
N2H 4N7
Canada
Phone: 226-241-8744
info@secgovcentre.org



Centre for
**Security
Governance**