CSG PAPERS

Synthesis Report:
Exploring the Transition from First to Second Generation SSR in Conflict-Affected Societies

Mark Sedra and Jinelle Piereder

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ABOUT THE PROJECT

This paper is the product of a multi-year CSG research project, titled *Exploring the transition from first to second generation SSR in conflict-affected societies*. Led by CSG Executive Director Mark Sedra, the project assesses and evaluates the impact of orthodox security sector reform (SSR) programming in conflict-affected countries. Employing a common methodology, the project features original research on four case study countries: Bosnia-Herzegovina, El Salvador, Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste. The case study countries chosen each feature two broad characteristics: they are recovering from conflict and making transitions from war to peace; and they are mature cases of SSR, in that they have been subjected to at least ten years of externally supported SSR programming of some form. It is also important to note that geographical diversity played an important role in case study selection, with four distinct regions represented – Balkans, Central America, West Africa, and Asia-Pacific.

The SSR model as it is applied in war-to-peace transitions and broader state building projects is in the midst of a period of change. Over a decade of case study analysis, particularly in conflict-affected environments, has shown that the SSR model, as outlined in formative documents like the *OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform*, has had a meager record of achievement. A survey of key SSR implementation cases demonstrates a distinct conceptual-contextual gap. The principal tenets and features of the SSR model, like its holistic character, focus on governance, and human security orientation are rarely translated into practice in conflict-affected SSR settings. It can be argued that the SSR model in its fundamental form has never actually been applied as designed in conflict-affected environments, prompting many scholars and practitioners to explore new approaches seen as more viable in difficult implementation settings. This thinking is often loosely grouped under the heading of second generation SSR, involving a move to a new, more contextually attuned reform approach. This second generation SSR discourse is still nascent and ill-defined but rapidly taking form and gaining momentum.

The dominant objective that has united the still disparate second generation SSR thinking is the imperative of narrowing the conceptual-contextual gap. This discourse has already spawned some ad hoc programmatic initiatives in conflict-affected settings, often revolving around notions of empowering non-state security and justice providers as a means to build more sustainable and locally legitimate reform outcomes, or employing interim stabilization measures to help shape conditions for more conventional SSR interventions. In spite of the SSR model’s mixed record, SSR stakeholders and observers are not calling for its jettisoning, but rather a refashioning of the model’s core methods and good practices to make it more applicable in conflict-affected environments.
This project seeks to contribute to the gradual shift or transition in SSR policy and practice, through comparative analysis of four prominent conflict-affected SSR cases. By investigating the impact of conventional SSR and tracking entry-points for alternative approaches, the project aims to generate innovative, evidence-based insights and practical recommendations to improve SSR policy and programming in conflict-affected contexts. Importantly, the project will provide a detailed evidence base on how SSR has been applied to transform the security and justice architectures of states making war-to-peace transitions. The project will ascertain what works and does not work in the application of the orthodox SSR model, and by extension if and how a second-generation SSR approach could deliver better results in conflict-affected environments.

As already mentioned, alternative or second-generation SSR initiatives are already emerging organically in many reform contexts, thus part of the purpose of the project will be to identify these instances and investigate whether they can inform changes to the wider SSR model. On a broader level the project seeks to advance constructive dialogue on the future of the SSR model, which has come under increasing scrutiny and pressure among policy-makers, practitioners and analysts in donor and recipient states alike due to its mixed record of achievement in conflict-affected environments.

The project seeks to answer the following main research questions for each case:

1. To what extent and how have SSR efforts followed the orthodox SSR model as described in the *OECD-DAC Handbook on SSR*? In assessing SSR efforts in each case study country, how have orthodox SSR approaches succeeded and failed and why?

2. What alternative approaches or entry-points for security and justice development programs are available? Are they used, and if so, how? If not, why?

The project has produced two reports per case study country – eight in total – one for each of the aforementioned research questions. The final report of the project – the ninth in the series – will synthesize the results of the case study research, drawing conclusions about the efficacy of orthodox SSR approaches and the potential for second generation SSR ideas.
ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Mark Sedra is the Executive Director of the Centre for Security Governance (CSG), a non-profit think tank that he co-founded in 2012. Mark’s research focuses predominantly on peace building and state building processes in fragile and conflict-affected states. He has conducted research on several countries and regions, including Afghanistan, Northern Ireland, the Middle East and the Balkans. Mark is also the President and co-founder of the Security Governance Group (SGG), a private consulting firm specializing on international security and governance issues, and a Fellow at the Balsillie School of International Affairs. He is the Editor-in-Chief of Stability: International Journal of Security and Development, a leading open-access international relations journal, and the co-editor of the Routledge Book Series titled Studies in Conflict, Security and Development.

Mark has published widely on international peace and security issues. His most recent book, Security Sector Reform in Conflict-Affected Countries: The Evolution of a Model, was published by Routledge in 2017.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In recent years the security sector reform model has lost some legitimacy in policy and practitioner circles. This stems from a poor track record in the field, underlined by major setbacks in a series of high-profile cases, most notably Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. Many of the same SSR stakeholders that rapidly embraced the concept after its emergence in the late 1990s have begun to reconceptualize their approaches to providing security and rule of law assistance in fragile and conflict-affected states. The SSR concept is not dead yet because large parts of the international community remain overtly wedded to its key norms and principles, but it has entered a tenuous transition period. The research project upon which this paper is based was launched to better understand why conventional SSR approaches have faltered and what changes could be made to the model to enhance its impact.

The paper synthesizes the results of more than a year of case study research conducted in countries that have been subjected to at least a decade of externally-supported SSR, Bosnia-Herzegovina, El Salvador, Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste. The SSR record in these four diverse countries was assessed using a common analytical framework. Each case study produced two reports, one that assessed the impact of conventional SSR approaches and a second that explored opportunities for innovative alternative initiatives or second generation SSR. The study found remarkable consistency across the cases in areas where the orthodox SSR model malfunctioned, for instance in civil society engagement and holism.

Taken together the case studies made a clear argument for a second generation SSR model, one that is more locally orientated, eschewing donor-driven templates, and more inclusive of a of local stakeholders. Looking at numerous embryonic second generation initiatives in the case study countries as well as emerging entry points for alternative programming, a broad outline of a second generation model begins to emerge. That model features a number of notable characteristics: it is pragmatic; people-centred; politically-attuned; deeply contextualized to local history, culture and political norms; long-term in outlook; and impact-focused. The second generation SSR model that begins to come into view through this synthesis of the case studies promises to be more locally owned and attuned, meeting the demands for greater agency by local actors, but also more cost-effective and economically sustainable for donors.

The paper does not end with a broad outline of a second generation SSR model, but proceeds to identify a number of steps that global SSR champions can take to hasten its emergence and fundamentally change the way they do business. This include the establishment of a global SSR institution; the development and deployment of new types
of human capacity to support ground-level SSR; the placement of new emphasis on sub-national interventions; and the development of new funding instruments and modalities. While the days are numbered for the orthodox SSR model, the concept itself is still badly needed. The transformation of security and rule of law systems in accordance with democratic and good governance principles remains one of the most stable pathways to stability and prosperity for fragile and conflict affected countries. This paper shows that a reoriented, second-generation SSR doctrine can narrow the conceptual-contextual gap that has undercut SSR implementation and deliver better outcomes for recipients on the ground.
# ACRONYMS & ABBREVIATIONS

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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APPC</td>
<td>Area Policing Partnership Committees</td>
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<td>CIC</td>
<td>Canadian International Council</td>
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<td>CPPC</td>
<td>Chiefdom Policing Partnership Committees</td>
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<td>CSOs</td>
<td>Civil Society Organizations</td>
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<td>CSS</td>
<td>Centre for Security Studies</td>
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<td>DCAF</td>
<td>Democratic Control of Armed Forces</td>
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<td>DDR</td>
<td>disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Crisis Group</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>LNP</td>
<td>Local Needs Policing</td>
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<td>LPPB</td>
<td>Local Police Partnership Boards</td>
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<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organizations</td>
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<td>NSPS</td>
<td>National Security Plan and Strategy</td>
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<td>OECD DAC</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<td>OHR</td>
<td>Office of the High Representative</td>
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<td>ONS</td>
<td>Office of the National Security Council</td>
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<td>ONUSAL</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador</td>
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<td>RUF</td>
<td>Revolutionary United Front</td>
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<td>SALW</td>
<td>small arms and light weapons</td>
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<td>SIPA</td>
<td>State Investigation and Protection Agency</td>
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<td>SLP</td>
<td>Sierra Leone Police</td>
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<td>SSD</td>
<td>security sector development</td>
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<td>SSR</td>
<td>security sector reform</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNDPKO</td>
<td>United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<td>UNMAS</td>
<td>United Nations Mine Action Service</td>
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INTRODUCTION

The Security Sector Reform (SSR) model as it is applied in war-to-peace transitions is in a state of flux. Over a decade of case study analysis, particularly in conflict-affected environments, has shown that SSR, as outlined in formative documents like the *OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform* (OECD, 2007), has had a meagre record of achievement (Sedra, 2017). A survey of key SSR implementation cases demonstrates a distinct “conceptual-contextual gap” (Chanaa, 2002) in reform outcomes. The principal tenets and features of the SSR model, like its holistic character, governance focus, and human security orientation are rarely translated into practice in conflict-affected SSR settings. It can be argued that the SSR model in its fundamental form has never actually been applied as designed in conflict-affected environments, prompting many scholars and practitioners to explore new approaches seen as more viable in difficult settings. This thinking is often loosely grouped under the heading of second generation SSR, involving a move to a more pragmatic, contextually attuned reform approach. The second-generation SSR discourse is still nascent and ill-defined but gradually taking form and gaining momentum.

The dominant objective that has united the still disparate second generation SSR thinking is the imperative of narrowing the conceptual-contextual gap. This discourse has already spawned some ad hoc programmatic initiatives in conflict-affected settings, often revolving around notions of empowering non-state security and justice providers as a means to achieve more sustainable and locally legitimate reform outcomes, or employing “interim stabilization measures” (Colletta and Muggah, 2009) to help shape conditions for more conventional SSR interventions. In spite of the SSR model’s mixed record, most SSR stakeholders and observers are not calling for its jettisoning, rather a refashioning of the model’s core methods and best practices to make it more viable in conflict-affected environments.

Moreover, the key goal of establishing state-level security institutions has had uneven results. While some centralized institutions have been established, in the defence sector, for example, in the areas of policing and judiciary there remain ongoing challenges to centralization efforts. A key challenge to the SSR agenda has been the competing visions for the future of the Bosnian state by the local actors. For their part, international actors have used SSR as a tool for political change by, for example, pushing for centralization and linking reforms to European membership. This has, in some cases, such as police and judiciary reform, led to pushback from some Bosnian political elites. Therefore, the Bosnian case illustrates the limits of externally driven agendas and the challenges in overcoming divisions in divided societies.

Second Generation SSR Synthesis Paper
Despite its travails, SSR is still part of the standard operating procedure for donors operating in fragile, failed and affected states, with the language of SSR now a part of the vernacular of the development, governance and security fields (DCAF, 2007). In May 2014 at the UN Security Council’s opening debate on the adoption of Resolution 2151, the UN’s first standing resolution on SSR, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon explained that “a professional and accountable security sector under the framework of the rule of law can strengthen public confidence in the State and provide the stability necessary for peacebuilding and development” (UN DPKO and UNMAS, 2014). He went on to stress that the aim of SSR was a “collective goal” of the United Nations (Ibid.). This reaffirmation of the UN’s commitment to SSR reflects the importance that it ascribes to it as a key tool of the global peace and security architecture, but also points to the growing unease within the UN system over its spotty record.

The project upon which this synthesis paper is based is intended to provide policy-oriented research and analysis to enrich and advance the emerging second-generation SSR discourse and support emerging processes to develop second-generation SSR policies and strategies. This paper will seek to advance this goal by highlighting lessons learned from comparative analysis of four geographically diverse case studies that have experienced significant levels of externally-supported SSR activity: Bosnia-Herzegovina, El Salvador, Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste. By investigating the impact of conventional SSR and tracking entry-points for alternative approaches in these diverse settings, the project aims to generate innovative, evidence-based insights and practical recommendations to improve SSR policy and programming in conflict-affected contexts. This project seeks to ascertain what works and does not work in the application of the conventional SSR model, and by extension how a second-generation SSR approach could potentially deliver better results in conflict-affected environments.

The case study countries chosen each feature two broad characteristics: they are recovering from conflict and making transitions from war to peace; and they are mature cases of SSR, in that they have been subjected to at least ten years of externally supported SSR programming of some form. It is also important to note that geographical diversity played an important role in case study selection, with the four countries emanating from unique geographical regions — Europe, Central America, West Africa, and the Asia-Pacific.

The case study research for this project was guided by the following research questions:

1) To what extent and how have SSR efforts followed the orthodox SSR model as described in the OECD-DAC Handbook on SSR and related texts? And, in what areas have orthodox SSR approaches succeeded and failed?

2) What alternative or non-conventional SSR approaches have been tried and how have they fared? And, are there other entry points for alternative approaches that have not been seized upon?
Two research reports were produced for each case study country, one dedicated to each of the research questions. This synthesis paper summarizes the results of those eight reports. It will assess the main lessons from the reports to draw conclusions about the efficacy of orthodox SSR approaches and the potential for second generation SSR ideas.

This paper has three sections: Section one outlines eleven key principles of SSR, framed as performance indicators of a methodological tool to assess the impact of orthodox SSR programming in the case study countries. The second section analyzes the record of orthodox SSR in the case study countries, including an assessment through letter grades of the degree to which the various SSR programs adhered to the eleven key principles articulated in the first section. The third and final section explores any alternative approaches to SSR tried in the case study countries and potential entry points for second-generation programming that emerged. Building on the experience of these non-traditional initiatives, the section outlines eight characteristics of a second-generation SSR model. The section concludes with four practical recommendations of broad policy and programmatic changes that could to operationalize a second generation SSR approach.

I. KEY NORMS & PRINCIPLES OF SSR

The SSR model is rooted to several key norms and principles that set it apart from Cold War-era train-and-equip security assistance. Taken together these principles provide a good lens to assess the efficacy of SSR programming. While it may be difficult to determine with any precision the medium- and long-term impacts of SSR programming on local security, development, and political conditions given the range of other variables at play, it is possible to assess the extent to which reform processes have adhered to the core norms and principles of the SSR model. The following analytical framework identifies eleven indispensable elements of the SSR model that make it distinct from other forms of donor security assistance. A security assistance programme can only rightfully be labelled SSR if it adheres to these principles, thus it offers a good litmus test of the record and applicability of the concept in conflict-affected settings.

1. Local Ownership

Local ownership is widely understood as the *sine qua non* of SSR (Donias, 2008). First introduced in a 1995 OECD DAC report, the ownership concept “in its most positive sense... reflects a desire on the part of external actors to avoid undermining pre-existing local processes that may be the most effective response to local political questions” (Chesterman 2007: 9). Timothy Donais defines it as “the extent to which local actors (however defined)
exercise control or influence over the initiation, design and implementation of reform processes” (Donias, 2009: 118) As Daniel Bendix and Ruth Stanley note, “local ownership as participation confers legitimacy on reform, guards against criticism and helps rebuild trust in the security sector” (Bendix and Stanley, 2008: 97).

The OECD DAC’s 2004 Guidelines and Reference Series document Security System Reform and Governance states: “the most critical task facing countries embarking on SSR processes is to build a nationally-owned and led vision of security” (OECD, 2004: 12). It also cautions donors “to avoid the temptation to support supply-driven initiatives” because “reforms that are not shaped and/or driven by local actors are unlikely to be implemented effectively or sustained” (OECD, 2007: 11). A 2010 OECD DAC review of the impact of the OECD DAC Handbook claims, “evidence across a range of different contexts suggests that a home-grown SSR process, no matter how imperfect or slow, will be more useful than an imposed process” (OECD, 2010: 15-16).

While consultation and participation may be mechanisms to encourage ownership, most scholars and practitioners agree that it is insufficient to embed the type of deep-seated, wide-ranging local ownership and leadership required to make SSR programmes successful. According to Eirin Mobekk, “consultation and participation are not local ownership, although they can be part of the process. Nor is ‘buy-in’ local ownership; it is an external solution to an internal problem where externals seek to convince locals it is the right one for them” (Mobekk, 2010: 232). The real question, according to Laurie Nathan, “is not ‘how can we undertake SSR in partner countries?’ but ‘how can we support local actors who want to undertake SSR in partner countries?’” (Nathan, 2007: 2).

2. Civil Society Engagement

The orthodox SSR model views the engagement of civil society as both a near-term vehicle to promote national ownership of the process and a long-term mechanism to guarantee accountability and transparency in the sector. The OECD DAC calls for the promotion of “dialogue between civil society and the security system actors” as a means to “encourage a broader understanding of the principles and objectives of SSR” (OECD, 2004). Engaging civil society is “often vital in fostering a supportive political environment through genuinely inclusive dialogue, especially when the country in question is politically unstable” (OECD, 2007). Civil society organizations (CSOs) play a direct constructive role in SSR “as watchdogs, agents of change and sources of technical input in the SSR process” (Ebo, 2007: 46). They can also serve as an important “transmission belt conveying information between the state and the wider populace” and as a “bridge, not only between state and society, but also between state and non-state actors, and between modern and traditional security institutions” (Ebo, 2007: 47). CSOs provide vertical accountability
within the security sector (as opposed to the horizontal form within states) and offer a crucial counterweight to state power and authority (Caparini, 2010: 245).

3. Political Will

Few SSR policy makers, practitioners or analysts would deny that SSR is a fundamentally political process, where success is dependent on the willingness of donor and recipient stakeholders to invest political capital in its implementation. Before exploring further the political facets and demands of SSR in conflict-affected environments, it is important to unpack the term political will. Derek W. Brinkerhoff defines it concisely as “the commitment of actors to undertake actions to achieve a set of objectives…and to sustain the costs of those actions over time” (Brinkerhoff, 2010: 1). It is a complex phenomenon involving a range of actors, actions, institutions and processes, and is difficult to measure: “similar to phenomena like ownership or capacity, political will exhibits a latent quality; it is not visible separate from some sort of action” (Brinkerhoff, 1999). Political will can be understood as an expression of determination on the part of an actor or entity to achieve a specific outcome through the investment of political capital — prestige, resources and alliances or networks — and take risks — to reputation, economic stability and security — in doing so.

Looking at the orthodox SSR model’s take on political will and the broader political dimensions of the process, the OECD DAC notes, “SSR is first and foremost a political process that requires careful political analysis and judgment on the side of the donor” (OECD, 2010: 12). To create a “supportive political environment” time must be spent “preparing the political terrain and understanding the context of reform” (OECD, 2007: 16, 28). Given that “reform processes inevitably create winners and losers as they challenge vested interests and existing power relationships”, their goals cannot be achieved through apolitical technical assistance alone (Ibid.: 29).

Technical assistance is a vital element of SSR processes but it is unlikely to be effective if not “accompanied by very intensive behind-the-scenes dialogue, relationship building (and, occasionally, pressure) in order to have a beneficial impact” (Hendrickson, 2009: 13). The ability to engage the process politically requires sophisticated political analysis, a willingness to engage “with the political drivers of change within the security sector” and an openness to expend political capital (Ibid).

4. Sustainability

The purpose of SSR is to build a self-sufficient security sector, not an external dependency. As the 2008 UN Secretary General’s Report on SSR states, “the reform of the security
sector must proceed from a clear and realistic consideration of what is financially, operationally and logistically viable” (UNSG, 2008: 11). Ensuring that SSR projects are fiscally sustainable demands, in the words of the OECD DAC, that donors “minimise the risks associated with under-provision of security due to the overly stringent application of fiscal policies; and...limit the development of expansionary security policies that dominate public spending, thereby pushing back opportunities for early exit by the international community” (OECD, 2007: 75). This structured approach to SSR is encapsulated in the term “right-financing”, which involves “striking an appropriate balance between current security needs and the goal of building a fiscally sustainable security sector based on realistic resource projections” (Middlebrook and Peake, 2008: i). It is “essentially about determining an acceptable trade-off between ‘right-sizing’ security forces and higher-quality and more equitable security services over time” (OECD, 2007: 75).

5. Coordination

SSR programmes tend to be multi-lateral exercises, involving numerous state and non-state bodies — internal and external — each bringing with them their own interests, capacities, experiences, and approaches. Given the complexity of SSR programmes, where activities can range from “conducting a defence review, setting-up a community-policing programme, and at the same time improving pre-trial detention conditions...It is highly unlikely that a single government department or intergovernmental agency will possess the full range of skills needed” for full implementation (Clingendael Institute, 2008: 1-2). The UN calls “coordination of national and international partners’ efforts...essential” and argues that “lead national entities and a designated international counterpart should be identified wherever possible” (UNSG, 2008: 13). Coordination should occur at various levels, according to SSR orthodoxy: donor-to-donor, donor to partner government, donor to civil society, government to government, government to civil society, and within donors among their constituent agencies and departments. There are as many interests as actors working on SSR in any context, some contradictory, raising the stakes of effective coordination.

6. Holistic

One of the defining characteristics of SSR is its holistic character. Whereas Cold War forms of security assistance focused almost exclusively on coercive instruments and institutions — such as the military, police, and intelligence services — the SSR model features a much wider focus, recognising the intricate interconnections and mutual dependencies between security, justice, and governance structures. As the logic of the model goes, the police, for instance, cannot fulfil its mandated role without an effective judiciary and penal system. More broadly, security institutions lack robust oversight mechanisms, both
state and non-state, and will be more prone to overstretch their authority and commit abuses. The UNSG notes “that the effective protection of civilians and assistance in post-conflict environments requires a coordinated strategy that goes beyond the political or military aspects of a conflict” (Ibid.: 4). The SSR model “involves a much wider range of national and international institutions and actors” than just the military, highlighting “the need for security arrangements that take into account the linkages between the different actors” (Ibid.: 6-7). Holistic approaches to SSR, referred to interchangeably as integrated or comprehensive, don’t just balance the ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ elements of the security sector, but also see the process as embedded within wider peace-building and state-building strategies. As the OECD DAC explains, “there are clear linkages between SSR and peace agreements, international peace support operations (PSOs), programmes for the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants (DDR), transitional justice initiatives, and small arms and light weapons (SALW) control programmes” (OECD, 2007: 18). Accordingly, “ensuring that these tools and approaches are designed and delivered in a coherent and coordinated manner, with each informing and supporting the other, is important in delivering effective support for the overarching peace building objective” (Ibid.). In other words, the absence of linkages between the various facets of war-to-peace transitions will not only compromise their effectiveness, but could do harm.

7. Human Security Orientation

During the Cold War, the unambiguous referent object of security assistance was the recipient regime. The goal of assistance was to bolster allied regimes, primarily by enhancing the operational effectiveness of their security forces, with the overarching goal of advancing donor geostrategic, realpolitik objectives linked to the Cold War ideological struggle. The security of local populations was at best ignored and at worst perceived as a necessary sacrifice to ensure the survival of useful client regimes. The emergence of the SSR concept seemingly altered this calculus among donors, at least in theory. As the OECD DAC states, “at the heart of the security system governance agenda is the need to promote people-centred approaches to security” (OECD, 2010: 13). This shift in approach is not surprising given that the SSR concept was influenced by the broader “human security” agenda, which is based on two key ideas:

First, that the protection of individuals is critical to both national and international security; and second, that the security conditions required by people for their development are not limited to traditional matters such as national defence and law and order, but rather incorporate broader political, economic and social issues that ensure a life free from risk and ill-being (Ball, 2010: 32).

In short, “human security embodies a notion of security that goes beyond conventional concerns with military capacity and the defence of borders”, a foundational tenet of SSR (Duffield, 2006: 12).
8. Governance Focus

One of the central innovations of the SSR model is its focus on governance, the manner in which the security sector is managed, led, and overseen. Foreshadowing the emergence of the SSR concept, former UNSG Kofi Annan explained that the emerging global good governance agenda should include “the reform of public services — including the security sector, which should be subject to the same standards of efficiency, equity and accountability as any other public service” (Annan, 1999: 5). Such notions influenced the development of the SSR model. The concept is not neutral in the type of governance it seeks, namely Weberian state structures conforming to liberal democratic principles. This new focus on governance, moving away from the singular preoccupation with operational effectiveness during the Cold War, is driven by the notion that “countries and subnational areas with the weakest institutional legitimacy and governance are the most vulnerable to violence and instability and the least able to respond to internal and external stresses” (World Bank, 2011: 7). In other words, badly governed and managed security sectors have a detrimental impact, not only because of their inability to constructively foster a stable and secure environment for economic, political, and social development, but because they often pose a direct threat to communities through various types of abuses of power, from corruption to predatory armed violence.

The OECD DAC argues, “experience has shown that the ‘train and equip’ initiatives often supported by international actors are unsustainable and ineffective if they are not linked with more far-reaching governance reforms, particularly the development of managerial processes and procedures” (OECD, 2007: 35). The SSR concept is predicated on “a balance in strengthening both service delivery and governance” (Ibid.: 35).

9. Long-Term Outlook

At its core, SSR is a process of institutional transformation and social engineering, thus it is invariably a long-term undertaking. The UNSG report explains:

There are no quick fixes for establishing effective and accountable security institutions. The development of strategies, structures and capacities is a time-consuming effort. The evolution of perspectives, dialogue and understanding is equally a long-term process (UNSG, 2008: 19).

SSR is widely understood to be a generational project: “Restoring confidence and transforming security, justice, and economic institutions” may take “a generation...in countries that have experienced severe conflict” (World Bank, 2011: 2; OECD, 2007: 25). But success even in that extended time frame is contingent on “determined national leadership” and durable donor political and material support (Ibid.).
10. Democratic Foundations

SSR is not an ideologically neutral concept. According to the UK’s 2003 SSR strategy, the primary objective of SSR “is to support governments of developing and transitional countries so that they can fulfil their legitimate security functions through reforms that will make the delivery of security more effective and democratic, thereby reducing the potential for both internal and external conflict” (UK Government, 2003: 3). This is rooted to the idea that “a democratically run, accountable and efficient security system helps reduce the risk of conflict, thus creating an enabling environment for development” (OECD, 2007: 13). At its core, SSR is about moving a state’s security sector — “its practices, doctrines and management structures — towards Western norms of behaviour” (Bellamy, 2003: 106). As Bellamy argues, SSR endeavours to “assist the process of building democratic peace by fostering armed forces that reflect and promote liberal democratic values” (Ibid.). Not only does SSR seek to inculcate the host security sector with the central principles of liberal democracy, paramount of which is democratic civilian control of the security forces, but it aims to integrate that security sector into the broader liberal democratic global order.

11. Context-Specific

While the OECD DAC Handbook and many other SSR strategy documents seem to provide a rather formulaic agenda for the implementation of SSR, they also conversely call for respect for the local context. “A key challenge”, says the OECD DAC, is “ensuring that SSR programs are context specific” (OECD, 2007: 8). As the 2008 UNSG report claims, “states and societies define and pursue security according to their particular contexts, histories, cultures and needs. No single model of a security sector exists” (UNSG, 2008: 6). Developing context-specific reform strategies requires “a thorough understanding of the system for which change is sought, and the actual needs that exist” (US Government, 2009: 11).

Defining Second Generation SSR

Before moving on to the case study analysis it is important to give a general overview of the evolving thinking on second generation SSR. It is an outgrowth of what Richmond and Tellidis have dubbed a “post-liberal peace” (Richmond and Tellidis, 2009: 11), as it seeks to forge a stronger link between the liberal orthodox SSR model and local norms, structures, and modes of behaviour in recipient countries. There is a growing belief that SSR is too utopian, technocratic, state-centric, and donor-driven to succeed in its current form (Sedra, 2018: 48-63). Second generation SSR is less a sharp break with the original model
than it is a rebalancing of its implementation approach to place new onus on principles that will make it more viable in difficult reforms contexts.

While there is no universally accepted second generation SSR model, a number of characteristics have emerged that collectively form a coherent alternative vision:

- **A willingness to engage non-state actors, norms and structures:** This involves the acceptance and expansion of hybrid security and justice systems, facilitating complementarity between the state and non-state. This idea is based on the reality that a stronger state is not always the solution in conflict-affected societies; in many contexts state security institutions lack legitimacy and are seen as predatory and corrupt. By extension non-state security and justice bodies may be more effective and widely trusted by the population.

- **Less normative:** Second-generation SSR is less ideologically prescriptive, accepting that there are different routes to reform that are potentially more pragmatic and locally legitimate than the standard liberal-democratic state-building template. Being less normative does not mean that the strategy adopted will be innately hostile to core liberal principles; rather it will likely from a hybrid of liberal and local reform ideas and approaches.

- **Acceptance that SSR is an evolutionary process:** A move to eschew rigid reform blueprints in favour of iterative and incremental processes that allows for greater flexibility and the gradual development of contextually attuned strategies. Speed is not always a virtue in SSR programs and can do harm.

- **More modesty in SSR visions:** An acceptance that modest, sustainable reform interventions are more effective than massive, resource intensive engagements. In other words, more resources do not always produce better reform results and can actually do harm.

- **Willingness for long-term engagements:** An acceptance that SSR is a generational project, and there is a need to frame engagements and resource commitments accordingly.

- **More bottom-up:** More focus on community-level interventions. Existing approaches tend to be elite-centred, overly statist, and geographically focussed on capital cities and major-urban centers. This shift to bring the local into the reform agenda, demands better understanding of the recipient countries on the part of external actors, as well as a willingness to change the composition of their SSR support missions, drawing on more country and political specialists to complement technical expertise.

- **More political:** A renewed focus on the political dimensions of the process, the key
processes of bargaining and negotiation that establish the crucial foundation for SSR. This involves an upsurge in investment of political capital.

- **Focus on ownership:** Greater emphasis on facilitating local ownership and leadership of SSR processes in spite of concerns over capacity deficits and corruption, a focus that will require donors to accept greater fiduciary and political risk in their assistance programs.

## II. CASE STUDY SUMMARY AND LESSONS LEARNED

This section provides brief summaries of each of the four case study reports, highlighting key lessons learned for SSR programming in other conflict-affected contexts.

### Bosnia and Herzegovina

Peace-building and SSR in Bosnia began in 1995 following the Dayton Peace Accords, which ended an intensely violent four-year conflict. SSR efforts were largely internationally led and supported, and while stakeholders aspired to local ownership, little actual local ownership emerged in practice. This was at least partly due to the inability to create consensus among all ethnic parties on a comprehensive SSR strategy. Thus, international donors assumed the driver’s seat in the process.

There was some success in reforming the defence sector, particularly in dissolving the separate entity militaries and establishing a new state-level military. However, there was limited progress in policing and justice reform, undermining the holistic vision of the process. Once again, a key obstacle to success in these areas was the absence of domestic consensus due to longstanding political divisions. Bosnia certainly has a functioning security sector, and the overall security environment is stable. But there are ongoing challenges regarding coordination between the different police institutions, as well as police professionalism.

As the case study author, Branka Marijan, puts it, “[d]iffering political visions for the country get to the heart of the stalemate in all areas of Bosnian political life” (Marijan, 2016: 40). Even though good governance programs have been implemented, political parties continue to exercise influence and interference in police and justice work, undercutting democratic reforms.

In terms of emerging second-generation SSR approaches, Bosnia has seen a recent increase in civil society involvement in monitoring and oversight of security institutions, and has
also experienced several successful community policing initiatives and “citizen security forums” led by international agencies.

**Lessons**

Several important lessons can be drawn from Bosnia’s experience with SSR. The author emphasizes two, in particular: first, “despite a strong international presence, local actors and context always shape the success of any reform”; and second, “SSR is not a short-term process, nor is it necessarily linear” (Marijan, 2016: 41). In other words, backtracking can occur, especially when local conditions and political dynamics shift.

Bosnia also illustrates how the use of SSR as a political instrument can be problematic. For example, rather than police reform being mostly about improving the effectiveness and overall functioning of policing, reforms were structured to reduce the power of the sub-state entities and increase the power and authority of the central state. International stakeholders preferred a centralized structure, and saw reform as a way to bring Bosnia in line as a precondition for EU membership. This strategy made police reform very controversial, and entity-level resistance to reform continues to today.

Linked to this lesson, and specifically to the example of police reform, the Bosnia case highlights the need for flexible responses that can accommodate and adapt to existing political structures, rather than attempting to force change.

A fifth lesson from this case is that more attention must be paid to empowering local communities to engage in security sector oversight. Especially where SSR is largely state-centric and top-down, a complimentary bottom-up approach is needed (Ibid.: 27). Importantly, local actors must be empowered early on in the peacebuilding process, or risk eroding trust through externally imposed reforms.

Sixth, Bosnia illustrates the balancing act that the international community must perform when working with local authorities and politicians. While cooperative engagement is essential, appeasement of local elites may have longer-term negative consequences for SSR (Ibid.: 26).

Finally, a perhaps subtler lesson for SSR is the need to consider longer-term unintended consequences of short-term reforms. For example, parts of Bosnia’s military establishment are still divided along ethnic lines due to compromises earlier on in the process, which raises the risk of that advancements made in ethnic integration could be reversed. Reforms that may seem necessary, pragmatic, or “good enough” now, must not be so cemented as to prevent future important modifications in the future.
**El Salvador**

While the concept of SSR had not yet been fully elaborated when El Salvador’s security transition was launched, reforms to the Salvadoran security forces and justice system were a key component of the 1992 Chapultepec peace accords that ended El Salvador’s civil war.

In contrast to the Bosnia case, SSR in El Salvador was a highly locally owned process, both in the design and implementation phases. International stakeholders, such as the UN negotiation team and United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), largely functioned as discussion facilitators, and ceasefire and human rights monitors.

Overall, SSR in El Salvador was a modest success, at least in the short term. It addressed some of the key issues that led to the civil war in the first place. Reforms led to the creation of a new civilian police force, the depoliticization of the judiciary, and the reduction of military dominance of the security sector. This significant early progress was made possible by high levels of local ownership and political will, as well as the inclusion of specific reforms in the peace accords themselves.

However, there was an absence of a holistic and long-term vision for the security sector. As part of this absence, there was insufficient coordination between SSR and simultaneous DDR efforts, which ended up leading to a security vacuum and rising levels of crime in the post-conflict period. The lack of long-term vision of stakeholders was compounded by an inability to adapt to new security challenges, particularly rising crime rates and social violence. The country has dealt with a near-continuous security crisis since the early 2000s as a result.

Furthermore, an insufficient focus on security governance undermined the progress that was made. Issues of transparency and impunity were addressed in some institutions, but there was a lack of political will to support reforms of this nature in all branches of government.

While no real conversations about alternative or second-generation SSR approaches have emerged, the case study author argues that violence prevention and reduction programs are a key entry point.

**Lessons**

The El Salvador case highlights five key lessons for future SSR efforts in-country and more generally.

First, “technical and administrative SSR is not enough to ensure people’s security” (Piché, 2016: 27). By nature, SSR is a political process, and must therefore be long-term and include marginalized groups to “spur transformative dialogue” (Ibid.).
Second, SSR must not only increase institutional capacity, but also enable an adaptive institutional culture able to deal with changing security conditions and new threats. This sort of cultural change takes time, especially in contexts with legacies of authoritarianism, repression and high levels of marginalization.

Third, security is a prerequisite for development and democratization. El Salvador shows how, in the face of security crises, democracy can be re-threatened after successful democratization efforts.

Fourth, SSR processes must pay attention to non-state actors, including criminal gangs, which are part of the security ecosystem, especially in violence prevention and reinsertion programs. Doing so provides an opportunity to not only reduce violence, thereby decreasing pressure on security institutions, but also to create space for additional reform.

Finally, SSR is fundamentally an incremental process. For it to be sustainable, SSR must prioritize certain areas of reform where change is possible, rather than attempt to address everything at once. It should focus on creating the conditions that will allow and enable capacity building and professionalization of security institutions, as well as broader systemic change.

Sierra Leone

SSR efforts in Sierra Leone began in 1999, before conflict between the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and the state officially ended in 2002. Since the security sector itself was a large part of the perceived and actual threat to peace in Sierra Leone, SSR needed to target state actors first and foremost. Initial reforms focused on the military, police and intelligence sectors and included restructuring systems, developing infrastructure, establishing internal disciplinary mechanisms and equipping the security forces. However, there was no clear SSR strategy until after 2003, which meant that opportunities were missed to craft a more holistic approach that engaged important non-state actors.

The SSR process has been heavily donor funded and driven, predominantly by the UK, which – despite the value of reliable, long-term international partners – is now proving problematic for reform sustainability. In the immediate wake of the conflict, political will to support reform was strong; but as the country became more stable, political will declined and the government’s attention shifted to socio-economic development. Current shifts in funding priorities (domestically and for donors) risks reversing some of the gains made.

A major success of SSR – and of emerging second generation SSR approaches – was the establishment of community-level security structures, including the Local Needs Policing (LNP) system, which greatly improved relations between security actors and local
populations. These structures serve as early warning mechanisms for conflict triggers, help identify human rights abuses and refer victims to appropriate authorities (Bangura, 2016).

**Lessons**

Sierra Leone offers several lessons for future SSR efforts in the country and elsewhere.

First, the case underlines the importance of a shift to a human-security approach to SSR. Importantly, many of the emerging threats in Sierra Leone and in other countries – including human trafficking, money laundering, terrorism, cybercrime, piracy and smuggling – can only be effectively curbed using a human security approach. Community-level security structures are a step in this direction.

Second, Sierra Leone demonstrates the value of creating and working with decentralized security structures, especially when traditional community security and justice systems exist. For example, the LNP system provides a mechanism to engage civilians in security issues, ensure civilian oversight of police institutions, restore public trust in the police, and make policing more effective.

Third, the case shows the value of long-term international partners. The British Government signed a 10-year MOU in 2002 to support both DDR and SSR efforts. This sustained and focused support, so rare for single donors in SSR settings, meant that coordination of SSR and other peacebuilding efforts was somewhat less of a challenge. At the same time, this case demonstrates the struggle to sustain reforms when SSR is largely donor supported and led. The situation endowed one donor with a disproportionate degree of authority over the process, which can have the perverse effect of discouraging robust local ownership.

Fourth, even if initial SSR efforts are focused primarily on central state institutions to establish the viability of the government and prevent conflict recurrence, it must gradually become less state-centric, more contextualized, and more connected to local and non-state actors in order to be sustainable.

**Timor-Leste**

Timor-Leste declared independence from Indonesia in 1999, following decades of conflict. As a newly independent state, the Timor-Leste government set about constructing a new security sector from scratch. Security sector development (SSD) and SSR processes were entirely UN-led at the outset and were initially tied to peacekeeping mission mandates.
These early efforts erroneously institutionalized Indonesia-era factionalism in the security sector, which later contributed to the onset of the 2006 crisis when a renegade faction of the security forces rebelled against the government necessitating an international intervention to restore order.

Following the 2006 crisis, the government began to take more ownership of the SSD/SSR process, which then led to tensions with international stakeholders. The government went so far as to develop their own parallel SSR process alongside that of the UN, which it saw as externally driven and divorced from local needs. In an effort to improve relations between the military and the police, the government initiated joint military-police operations beginning in 2008. While the joint operations created a unity effort and purpose among the security forces that was lacking, they have been highly criticized for blurring the lines between policing and military responsibilities, violating the “constitutional framework”, and for failing to follow due process (Dewhurst et al., 2016: 22).

The final UN mission withdrew in 2012, leading to an increase in local ownership and a resurgence of political will for reform. SSR began to address factionalism in the security forces through new legislation and pay and rank reforms.

In terms of second generation SSR, several more flexible and modest processes have emerged in the post-2012 environment, including: connecting skills development and systems building to improve institutional professionalism; engagement with traditional justice systems and non-state actors; the launch of new forums with security sector stakeholders; community-police perception surveys; and support for reform-minded institutional leaders through training/workshops (Ibid.: 55).

Lessons

Timor-Leste offers many important lessons for the future of SSR.

First, SSR must be politically astute and long-term. Without these elements, serious mistakes can be made in the formation (or reformation) of a security sector, as was the case with the UN’s approach that inadvertently created the conditions for the 2006 crisis. As Dewhurst et al explain, “the UN was always caught between the aim of promoting the ‘gold standard’ in democratic governance and human rights, and the political realities and compromises needed to keep the country stable in the short term” (Ibid.: 16).

Second, externally imposed reforms are not likely to stick because they lack legitimacy. While international support is important to SSR, especially for a brand-new state, that support should be consultative rather than prescriptive, and should be adaptive to unique contexts. Additionally, human security approaches to SSR should also engage non-state security actors with local legitimacy to drive bottom-up change.
Third, initial standards for reforms should focus on being “good enough” rather than “ideal.” Rather than imposing major and demanding reforms on fragile or new institutions, SSR stakeholders should use interim stabilization measures to buy time and prepare for more extensive reform.

Fourth, the legitimacy of SSR can be fragile. It can be threatened by: a lack of consensus on the role of future security sector institutions, potentially leading to civil unrest; and/or a failure of democratic checks and balances on those institutions, as has been the case with joint operations in Timor-Leste since 2008.

Fifth, it may sometimes be necessary for the international community to intervene in a conflict relapse, as during the 2006 crisis, but it may also undercut key principles of SSR, especially local ownership. Donors must balance the need to provide an enabling for reform with the danger of delegitimizing the process through direct interference.

Sixth, community policing has potential to strengthen public trust and civilian engagement in security issues, but it is important to come to a consensus on a coherent approach. For example, some international donors maintained a preference for repressive/reactive policing culture rather than an empowering/preventive culture.

Grading the Case Studies

In each of the four cases, orthodox SSR processes were evaluated based on the eleven key performance indicators outlined in Section I: local ownership, civil society engagement, political will, sustainability, coordination, holism, human security orientation, governance focus, long-term outlook, democratic foundations, and context-specific (See Annex I for a full description of the evaluation methodology). This section considers each indicator across the four cases, synthesizing the results, and offers several insights regarding interactions, patterns, and compromises.

Looking at the grades summary, the best performing indicators across the four cases were political will, sustainability and governance focus. Overall, the worst performing indicators were civil society engagement and holism. Local ownership was also poor in all but one case (El Salvador).
Local Ownership

El Salvador was the only case with a high grade on this indicator. This was largely due to the fact that when the Salvadoran transition began SSR had not yet been elaborated as a concept in the international community, and so there were no external models to impose. Local ownership also meant that SSR could be designed in a more context-specific way. Interestingly, this high grade also corresponded with low grades for both governance focus and long-term outlook, demonstrating the potential drawbacks or trade-offs of local ownership when elites seek to protect the status quo.

While the timing of reform in Bosnia was close to that of El Salvador, the Bosnian conflict
and post-conflict reconstruction process had much more international attention, partly because of the intensity of the violence and the proximity to Western Europe. Accordingly, the security transition in Bosnia was heavily externally-driven from its outset. Initially, local ownership in Timor-Leste was poor, but improved significantly following the final withdrawal of the UN in 2012. Interestingly, the case study authors point out that the bulk of the SSR performance indicators improved markedly for Timor-Leste after the scaling down of the international intervention (see Annex 2). This provides more evidence of the positive effect of high levels of local ownership on all elements of the process. Sierra Leone’s SSR programme also became more locally owned over time as it began to shift toward human security and community-level security concerns, which improved the legitimacy and efficacy of the process. In many ways, the level of ownership is the single most important predictor of SSR impact.

Civil Society Engagement

All four cases had relatively low levels of civil society engagement, especially in the initial stages of SSR. Both Bosnia and Timor-Leste are beginning to see increased engagement on issues of security institution oversight, monitoring, and anti-corruption. El Salvador’s context is quite different when it comes to non-state actors, and its key challenge going forward is figuring out how to engage more controversial security ecosystem actors such as gangs when seeking to reduce crime/violence. Civil society engagement in Sierra Leone has been difficult because of the government’s belief that security matters belong exclusively to the state, a common challenge for SSR missions in conflict-affected and post-authoritarian states. That said, community-level security institutions, including local policing, provide mechanisms for civilian involvement. In all the cases, civil society engagement was always treated as a peripheral activity of donors and local stakeholders alike, advanced on an ad hoc rather than systemic basis. This, despite the fact that initiatives that did involve civil society actors tended to be disproportionately impactful.

Political Will

As already discussed, the key obstacle to greater political will for SSR in Bosnia is the lack of domestic consensus on the role of future security institutions. While some areas of reform have been successful, the police and justice systems remain fragmented and vulnerable to political interference. For the other three cases, political will waxed and waned depending on: the degree of local ownership (as in Timor-Leste); the sense of urgency for reform in the wake of instability (as in Sierra Leone); or the persistence of “bad” practices and attitudes such as extralegal violence, corruption, and impunity even after formal reforms were completed (as in El Salvador). International donors seemingly lacked robust tools in all the cases to address political will deficits.
Sustainability

In Bosnia, both the international community and local stakeholders astutely paid special attention to the financial sustainability of the defence sector, given that the cost of maintaining parallel ethnic forces was seen as prohibitive. But in the policing sphere, a lack of progress to centralize institutional structures has meant that the separate entity forces will likely face sustainability challenges.

The security sector in El Salvador is considered self-sufficient, but there are problems with partisan resource allocation as well as major violence containment costs that prevent other kinds of reforms and development.

Both Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste now face sustainability challenges, since SSR in each case has been highly donor supported and lacked long-term strategies. Shifts in funding priorities potentially threaten reform backsliding in Sierra Leone. While Timor-Leste became less donor dependent in 2005 thanks to new oil revenues, the government does not have enough funds to support the security sector long-term — especially given the high costs of joint operations.

Coordination

Coordination challenges in Bosnia are intimately linked to the politically divided nature of the country. While the OHR and EU cooperated well during the initial reforms, domestic coordination between different entity services (especially police) is largely ad hoc.

The key coordination problem in El Salvador was between the SSR and DDR processes, a disjuncture that contributed to a security vacuum and the subsequent crime wave. More generally, there are several coordination mechanisms within government, but they do not usually include broader stakeholder consultation or result in coherent programming and holistic strategies. Donor coordination has also been problematic.

In Sierra Leone, coordination was initially not a problem because the UK was overwhelmingly the largest donor to the process. However, as political will dwindled and domestic coordination between security actors deteriorated, confusion over mandates, responsibilities, and jurisdictions crept into the process.

For Timor-Leste, there was little coordination across sectors, particularly between security and justice. International donors often competed, even actively manoeuvring against each other’s efforts, which allowed the Timorese government to play them off each other. Domestic coordination improved by 2013, with the government’s more robust ownership role, but many international donors still prefer to operate bilaterally.
Holism

The issues that prevented better coordination in each case also hindered the coalescing of holistic approaches. In Bosnia, a lack of synergy between different parts of the security sector led to problematic disconnects between the judicial and penal systems. The lack of a holistic vision and an overall public security strategy in El Salvador led to gaps between articulated policies and resource allocation. SSR in Sierra Leone was ad hoc until 2002, and then still largely piecemeal post-conflict. A more holistic approach in this case could have prevented some of the challenges currently faced in the correctional service and other institutions. In Timor-Leste, SSR was focused more on stabilization than on synchronized efforts to improve all aspects of the security sector, or development more broadly.

Human Security Orientation

In Bosnia, human rights norms and the security of local populations was prioritized, but the dominant view was that the path to more human security was found in stable central institutions, leading the international community to focus on conventional regime-centric initiatives. Sierra Leone’s SSR process was also regime-centric, but initially much less concerned with human security dimensions.

SSR in Timor-Leste also focused primarily on stabilization and formal systems reform. While human security efforts occurred at the same time, they were rarely explicitly linked. However, a bottom-up, people-centred approach has begun to emerge more recently, particularly regarding community policing.

El Salvador’s SSR process was considered human-security oriented because of its focus on ending human rights abuses by security institutions, and on “citizen security” rather than national security. However, a culture of impunity persisted, and human security principles were set aside later on in the reform process. Furthermore, the country has since experienced terrible human security conditions in the face of rising crime and violence, which reforms have proven impotent to address.

Governance Focus

Governance in Bosnia's SSR process received a lot of attention from the international community, but the imposition of good governance mechanisms has also undermined local ownership and capacity. Oversight mechanisms have been the main focus, but decision enforcement of these bodies is rather weak. SSR in Sierra Leone also included a governance focus, but implementation was narrow and not well funded, leaving major governance deficiencies unresolved.
For Timor-Leste, there were major challenges in establishing effective civilian oversight structures for security institutions, as the security sector needed to be developed from scratch. While a legislative framework for the sector was eventually developed and made important headway, good governance norms take longer to take root.

Governance is a key area of struggle for El Salvador, as a lack of transparency, partisanship, and a culture of impunity have persistently undermined security sector governance.

**Long-Term Outlook**

While the long-term goal of SSR in Bosnia was and is EU integration and membership, the majority of reforms have focused on the short- or medium-term. Similarly, most initial reforms in Sierra Leone focused on short and medium-term priorities associated to immediate stabilization. But several new military institutions have a clear, long-term reform outlook. In El Salvador, both external actors and the government had a short-term outlook on SSR, and were largely reactive when dealing with rising crime and violence (since 1995). SSR in Timor-Leste has only focused on stabilization or short-term reform priorities, which were critical at the time, but are no longer adequate. The short-term outlooks in each of the case study countries is consistent with the wider approach of SSR donors.

**Democratic Foundations**

As the Bosnia case study author writes, “the promotion of liberal democracy in Bosnia has been pursued through illiberal actions” (Marijan, 2016: 39). While democratic principles have been enshrined in most of the key SSR-related foundational documents, there are problems in practice. For example, there is insufficient civilian oversight and too much political party influence over the security sector in Bosnia.

Democratic principles regarding SSR (such as transparency, accountability, civilian oversight and respect for human rights) were a key part of the El Salvador peace accords, but a persistent culture of impunity has prevented real implementation of these principles. Furthermore, the country has seen a degree of democratic backsliding in the face of high levels of crime and violence. Exemplifying this backsliding, there has been growing pressure on the government to use the Salvadoran military in internal or “public security” operations when their disengagement from the domestic security sphere had been a key achievement of the peace process and SSR program (Piché 2016, 22).

In Sierra Leone, SSR was largely based on democratic governance. But a combination of intra-government politics and declining political will undermined these foundations and weakened interest in democratization efforts.
In Timor-Leste, the most significant challenge going forward is the lack of democratic accountability of the security sector institutions. Because the institutions are still largely dependent on dominant political leaders, there are opportunities for authoritarian tendencies. The use of joint operations without due legal process also threatens the government’s legitimacy, the separation of powers, and other democratic foundations.

Context Specific

In Bosnia, reforms were largely top-down and externally imposed rather than contextually attuned. The situation was similar in Sierra Leone, where external donors led reforms based on international policy templates rather than on local assessments and consultation. Fortunately, recent SSR activities in Sierra Leone better reflect local needs and ideas.

SSR and SSD were initially internationally imposed in Timor-Leste, with only limited consultation. This created serious legitimacy problems for the defence and police forces, later helping to trigger the 2006 crisis. Recent activities, such as community-oriented policing, are seen as more context-appropriate in how they use limited resources and engage traditional community structures.

In contrast to the other three cases, the reform process in El Salvador was highly adapted to the local context, due in part to significant local ownership. However, financial pressures and an absence of a long-term vision prevented further adaptation as the political and security environment evolved.

To best compare the performance of the SSR processes in the four case study countries, the case study authors were asked to assess the level of adherence of their case to the eleven SSR indicators using a common grading framework (see Figure 1). The framework required the researchers to assign a letter grade for each indicator based on a set of uniform criteria (see Annex 1). This gave the project an overarching sense of how the orthodox model has performed in very different conflict-affected contexts.

The study found remarkable consistency in areas where the orthodox SSR model malfunctioned; for instance, in civil society engagement and holism. By extension, it has revealed avenues where the model could be improved in a second generation formulation, hence the focus on community engagement and people centered approaches.

It is also important to note in comparing the evaluations of the four cases that none of the indicators is sufficient on its own or even in combination with one or two others for SSR success. The different elements are highly interactive and can work to support — but also sometimes contradict — each other. This makes an argument for a highly integrated and contextualized second generation model.
III. SYNTHESIS – WAYS FORWARD

All four case study authors recognize the need for alternative approaches to SSR that could overcome some of the key deficiencies and gaps in first generation SSR programming. The previous section showed consistent breakdowns in key facets of the orthodox model and general underperformance as demonstrated by the poor grades achieved across the cases. The subpar performance of first generation SSR in these cases provided an argument for a reorientation of the model. In their second report on potential entry for second generation approaches, the case study authors all pointed to the need for a “local turn” and the engagement of a wider cross section of actors.

In Bosnia, Branka Marijan notes, “there is a growing recognition in Bosnia among domestic and international SSR specialists and practitioners that there needs to be a movement away from orthodox approaches” (Marijan, 2017: 9). While she recognizes that the Bosnian case provides relatively fertile ground for more conventional SSR programming, at least compared to other more difficult conflict-affected cases (Ibid.: 26), she sees the gradual emergence of “an SSR 1.5” approach “where the aim is to include more civil society engagement” (Ibid.: 10). Marijan sees numerous successful initiatives in the area of community policing and wider community outreach in the security sphere as entry points for a wider shift in the SSR model that could deliver significant dividends. Flexibility, says Marijan, is crucial for a renewed SSR approach in Bosnia: “A more flexible second generation SSR model that can accommodate and adapt to existing political structures is more viable and desirable” (Ibid.: 28). This adaptability and flexibility, which allows for the engagement of state and non-state actors simultaneously is needed from the earliest stages of the process because the application of “second generation approaches is that much harder when there has been some 20 years of top-down orthodox approaches that have for the most part disempowered the local population” (Ibid.).

Gaëlle Rivard Piché explains that although “SSR is no longer part of the discourse on security and justice” among key government and donor stakeholders, the process remains “unfinished” (Piché, 2017: 11). In fact, the deterioration of security conditions in the country, which boasts one of the highest homicide rates in the world, has shown that many of the early achievements of the process have begun to erode. She argues that second generation SSR has potential to halt this slide by linking “state capacity-building efforts to violence reduction initiatives and broader socio-economic measures” (Ibid.). Piché goes on to explain that “community-based prevention programs and local peace process have shown promising results for violence reduction in El Salvador” and could form the core of a pragmatic, problem-specific and locally-focused vision of second generation SSR. Going local and engaging realities on the ground is a key to Piché’s conception of second generation SSR: “starting with what actually works at the local level could provide a more realistic and sustainable SSR strategy” (Ibid.).
Among Piché’s more provocative recommendations for second generation SSR is to engage a wide variety of stakeholders on the ground, including “criminal actors”, who “represent sources of power and authority crucial to SSR” (Ibid.). This is broadly in line with the less normative and more pragmatic bent that initial second generation SSR thinking has assumed. Piché makes a compelling argument that when you consider “that local cliques sometimes have more authority over communities than state security forces, ignoring those actors on the basis of political legitimacy or legality only means that SSR is incomplete” (Ibid.). Taking a less rigidly normative stance toward local engagement could help overcome some seemingly intractable challenges, like the exponential rise of criminal violence and organized crime. Like Marijan, Piché makes a case for flexibility and adaptability in second generation SSR programming that is not so firmly “state-centric” in its “understanding of what constitutes a country’s security sector” (Ibid.). She draws parallels to SSR programming in Africa and their engagement of non-state actors: “What applies for customary arrangements in Africa is also true for criminal organizations in Central America and elsewhere: it is not about who should provide security and who people should turn to for security, but rather who does provide security and who people do turn to for security” (Ibid.).

In Sierra Leone it has been the embrace of a hybrid approach to security governance, marked by “the creation of decentralized security and intelligence structures through the Office of the National Security Council (ONS) (Provincial, District and Chiefdom Security Committees) as well as the creation of the Local Police Partnership Boards (LPPB), Chiefdom Policing Partnership Committees (CPPC) and Area Policing Partnership Committees (APPC) by the Sierra Leone Police (SLP)” that has fostered the “crucial public trust and confidence in the security sector that had hitherto been lacking” (Bangura, 2017: 18). In many ways, the Sierra Leonean process already possesses characteristics of a nascent second generation SSR approach, exemplified by foundational documents like “the Security Sector Review documents and the newly developed National Security Plan and Strategy (NSPS)”, that emphasizes human security principles and a community-focused approach to security and justice provision (Ibid.). The local turn that has taken place in Sierra Leone, according to Ibrahim Bangura, marked a critical transition from a regime-centric to a people-centric approach. It helped to trigger a change in “people’s perceptions of, and participation in, justice and security related issues in Sierra Leone” (Ibid.: 7) that has stabilized the sector and helped to consolidate earlier gains. In this way, the move to a more hybrid, decentralized approach has helped bring SSR back to its conceptual roots.

Analysis of the Timor-Leste case shows that a turning point in the SSR program was the shift from international to local leadership of the process. Despite its conceptual commitment to the ownership ideal, in practice orthodox SSR programming typically takes the form of a donor-driven process. The dogmatic second-generation adherence to local ownership is in many ways a reaction to this distortion of the process, which
also shows how the second generation approach represents a renewal of the concept’s original principles. Sarah Dewhurst and Lindsey Greising emphasize that one of the key lessons from the Timor-Leste case has been the transformative potential of nurturing and engaging national NGOs, which can catalyze societal and political debate on how the government can “strike the right balance between stability, accountability and legitimacy in SSD” (Dewhurst and Greisling, 2017: 47). Consistent with the other case studies, they argue that rigid adherence to SSR blueprints is counterproductive; rather “a plethora of varying and complementary approaches to security sector development has been an effective ‘mosaic’ approach to bringing about long-term, sustainable and locally-led security sector development” (Ibid.: 48). In other words, second generation SSR approaches need to be agile and adaptable at the local level to respond to the unique and fluid conditions of each community.

Looking at the embryonic second generation initiatives in the case study countries as well as the emerging entry points for alternative programming, a broad outline of a second generation approach begins to emerge that features the following characteristics:

1. **Pragmatic, but Principled**

The model focuses on specific entry points where change is possible. It favours modest and iterative interventions, rather than comprehensive programs that seek simultaneous change across the whole security system. However, such a pragmatic approach need not eschew core liberal-democratic principles, like democratic civilian control of the security forces and the mainstreaming of human rights norms. Instead it favors a more deliberate and targeted approach that is more flexible and adaptable to local conditions.

2. **People-focused**

Second generation SSR represents a recommitment to a people-centered focus; moving away from the regime-centric emphasis that has characterized conventional SSR programming in the field. A people-centred approach is invariably more decentralized and locally-oriented. It is participatory, engaging a broader cross section of actors, including non-governmental organizations and traditional security and justice actors, rather than merely state bodies and their elite operators.

3. **Politically Attuned**

Second generation SSR programs need to be rooted to a keen awareness of the power dynamics underlying the security sector. Second generation SSR practitioners understand
that SSR has technical dimensions, but is an inherently political process that requires robust political engagement to succeed. Accordingly, the model recognizes key external and internal stakeholders must leverage their political capital to make the process successful. This can involve the use of various forms of political pressure and incentives to facilitate consensus and program implementation.

4. **Contextualized**

Building on the need for the process to be politically attuned, second generation SSR calls for careful adaption to local conditions, rather than adherence to reform templates. This demands a comprehensive effort to understand and develop a knowledge base on the local environment. Perhaps one of the hallmark characteristics of second generation SSR is that it must work with rather than around local cultural, historical, political and institutional realities, and needs to be locally owned. The role of international stakeholders in this formulation is confined to support and facilitation. External actors should always be in backseat rather than driver’s seat.

5. **Embrace Hybridity**

The case studies show that a second generation SSR model needs to have the willingness and capacity to work outside the state where possible. Hybridity in the context of second generation SSR means fostering productive relationships between state and non-state actors in the provision of security and justice services where such complementarity can deliver those services more effectively and enhance human security. Hybridity should not be a default objective but sought when local non-state security and justice structures are effective, perceived as legitimate, and not in contravention of international human rights principles. Even then, any hybrid arrangements must be based upon negotiation between local state and non-state actors, with external support or facilitation where required and appropriate. Donors must be prepared to take a multi-layered approach to reform that equips them to engage a multiplicity of state and non-state actors.

6. **Impact- Rather than Input-Focused**

Part of being pragmatic for second generation SSR is adopting of focus on achieving qualitative impacts, such as improved public perceptions of the security forces, rather than quantitative inputs, such as an increase in the amount of military and police equipment donated, to assess the efficacy of programming. Developing an impact-driven approach requires more effective and systematic monitoring and evaluation systems and standards,
which must become a core element of the second generation model.

7. Long-term Interventions and Reform Sustainability

All of the cases showed that there is a need for quick wins at the beginning of an SSR process to address immediate challenges and build momentum. However, care must be taken that such short-term activities are not undertaken at the expense of long-term progress as is so often the case with SSR. A long-term vision that promotes solutions that are financially and politically sustainable is the cornerstone of the second generation SSR approach. Any strategy that fails to consider the long-term viability of the structures and systems being established has the potential to do more harm than good. In this vein, it is important to recognize that excessive spending on reforms early in the process can drive corruption or foster a level of aid dependency that is inimical for the sector over the long-term. A second generation approach thus recognizes that when it comes to donor support and the provision of aid, less can be more in many circumstances.

While some of these core characteristics are merely re-affirmations of the key principles underlying the orthodox SSR model, they are more literally interpreted and assertively applied in a second-generation approach. They are more than conceptual window dressing for the new SSR; rather, they will be the focus of programming. Not only does a second generation SSR approach promise to be more locally owned and attuned, meeting the demands for greater agency by local actors, but will be more cost-effective and economically sustainable for donors. We have already seen some micro-level examples of second-generation SSR programming, such as the community policing and violence reduction programmes in Sierra Leone and El Salvador respectively, but such examples tend to be ad hoc rather than systematic.

Implementing a Second-Generation Approach

If SSR is to fully transition to a second generation SSR model, key global stakeholders will have to significantly change the way they do business. Steps they could take include:

Form a Global SSR Secretariat

The SSR field could use a global institution, preferably in the UN system, to act as a leader in the field. There is a SSR Unit in the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations but it only has a handful of staff and limited resources. There is a sizeable and reputable think tank, the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), that is almost exclusively dedicated to SSR and related issues, but it lacks the political clout or will to
assert a global leadership role in the field. A global institution of a significant size could provide the following functions:

• Develop common standards and flexible strategies for SSR in different settings, including a robust M&E framework;
• Collect and disseminate data on SSR implementation across the world, identifying trends;
• Serve as a clearing house and distiller of SSR best practices;
• Coordinate key SSR donors and stakeholders from intergovernmental organizations, states and non-governmental organizations;
• Form a large cadre of deployable experts for SSR missions and other instruments to rapidly mobilize assets for deployment;
• Create an SSR education and training regime;
• Develop and Manage SSR funding instruments; and
• Advocate for SSR in the UN system and beyond, providing critical political and thought leadership.

Deploy New Types of Mission Personnel

SSR missions need to be staffed with a wider variety of personnel, beyond technical specialists where there is an over-reliance. SSR missions should include geographic experts, who have specific expertise on local historical, socio-economic and political circumstances, and political operatives, whose responsibility it is to navigate the complex political environment surrounding SSR. Finally, it is advisable to deploy senior SSR envoys who can help to lead external support and coordinate the multi-faceted aid system surrounding SSR, especially when a large number of donors are engaged in a particular mission. SSR missions need to be more multi-dimensional, multi-disciplinary, locally attuned and politically-minded.

Balance National and Sub-National Interventions

Greater balance is required in the attention and resources allocated to national and sub-national SSR activities. Greater emphasis on sub-national programming needs to be accompanied by new insights on how to engage non-state actors in a variety of complex settings. Incentive structures for SSR practitioners need to be adjusted to encourage greater engagement with local civil society and other non-state actors. SSR programming needs to
balance efforts to reform national level structures and institutions with efforts to address local security and justice gaps and build bridges between formal and informal security and justice providers at the grass roots level. Reorienting the SSR model in this fashion requires a culture shift in SSR missions that will take some time to complete.

**Establish New Funding Instruments**

The SSR field requires new thinking on durable funding instruments to ensure that SSR programs are adequately financed and resourced. Such financing needs to be intricately linked with robust assessments and monitoring and evaluation frameworks that will allow donors and local stakeholders to assess success and failure in a more sophisticated way. This system will not only be able to determine where more resources are imperative, but when too much money is flowing into a reforming security system.

There is no doubt that to facilitate the emergence of a second generation SSR model, a paradigm shift is needed in the field. A new multi-lateral institution, new types of personnel for SSR missions, new guidelines and incentives to engage sub-national and informal actors, and new funding instruments are needed to catalyze this transformation of the SSR field.

**CONCLUSION**

SSR is entering the third phase in its evolution. Its first phase, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, saw the development of the conceptual model – what can be called the first generation SSR model – an outgrowth of the emerging liberal peace agenda and its various offshoots like the human security paradigm. The second phase, which ran roughly from 2002 to 2014, saw both the rapid institutionalisation of the model in the development and security policies of bilateral and multilateral organisations and the first wave of implementation. Since 2014, the model has been in its third phase of its development, which has been characterised by the distillation of lessons learned from the initial wave of implementation and emerging critical self-reflection over the marginal impacts it has produced. The case studies from this project showed that rather than advancing holistic, people-centred reform programmes dedicated to issues of governance, democratic accountability, and human rights, the first generation of SSR programmes in conflict settings typically comprised what Paul Jackson has called, “a rather mixed group of ad hoc policies and initiatives” delivering “‘traditional’ development and security activities... renamed and rebadged as SSR” (Jackson, 2011: 1811-1812). The growing unease with the first generation SSR approach has created fertile ground for a second generation model,
one that will aim to resolve the paramount dilemma of SSR, translating its core liberal principles into sustainable change on the ground in conflict-affected countries.

In 2018, SSR is a central element of virtually every peace-building and state-building project; it has been successfully mainstreamed in the global peace and security field as evidenced by the passing of the first standing UN resolution on SSR in 2014. However, the concept remains plagued by its inability to adequately engage the local context effectively. The model has lacked the wherewithal or capacity to engage in the type of local negotiation and programme adaptation necessary to advance SSR in complex conflict-affected countries. Not coincidentally, the characteristics of political acuity and programmatic flexibility have become indispensable elements of the evolving second generation SSR vision.

Baker and Scheye note that while orthodox “SSR programming seeks to be a ‘people-centred, locally owned’ project, in practice, SSR’s state-centric approach customarily fails to take into account the real needs, wishes, and demands of local populations” (Baker and Scheye, 2007: 505). The standardising logic of SSR contributes to technical, apolitical, and acontextual interventions, which limits its ability to take root in non-Western societies lacking a liberal and statist tradition. SSR in these settings is either resisted by local actors due to perceptions of neo-colonial external imposition or manipulated to advance the narrow political objectives of supportive local elites. Donors have hastened the failure of SSR in many contexts by either investing too little resources and political capital to catalyse meaningful change or funnelling too much money into local systems that lack the requisite absorptive capacity. As a result, orthodox SSR in conflict-affected states has become little more than a façade for illiberal practices and outcomes, a liberal Potemkin village.

The discordance and dissonance between the high stature of the SSR policy model and its poor and perverse impacts on the ground has raised questions about its viability in conflict-affected settings. The second generation SSR model is a reaction to this wavering commitment to the conventional SSR approach. It calls for the reorientation and revitalization of the SSR model, not its dissolution. In many ways the emerging second generation SSR discourse seeks to bring SSR back to its roots, placing new emphasis on some of its core principles like its people-centeredness, but with a less normative, statist, and donor-driven approach. This paper offers a view of how first generation SSR faltered in some highly favourable conflict-affected reform contexts. It also identifies entry points where second generation approaches are being explored in the field with positive results. This work should act as a springboard for further critical dissections of past SSR programming and the design of new programmatic approaches under the banner of second generation SSR, which can deliver better outcomes in the field and fulfil some of the initial promise of the SSR model.
NOTES

1. The terms “people-centered security” and “human security” are often used interchangeably. The term “human security” was first coined in the UNDP’s 1994 *Human Development Report*, which defined it as people’s “safety from chronic threats and protection from sudden hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life.” It expanded existing notions of security, identifying several components of human security: economic security; food security; health security; environmental security; personal (physical) security; community security; and political security. *UNDP, Human Development Report 1994* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). Human security meant more than just “freedom from fear” but also “freedom from want.” People-centered security has a more conventional and limited definition, meaning any security activity that takes people rather than regimes or other entities as its referent object. The two concepts are intimately interconnected, but human security in a strict sense implies a much wider range of activities.


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ANNEX I: EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

The evaluation framework applied to the four case studies for this project - Bosnia-Herzegovina, El Salvador, Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste -comprises 11 indicators that mirror the core SSR norms and principles. Taken together these SSR norms and principles provide a good lens to assess the efficacy of SSR programming, and thus form the backbone of the methodology for this project. While it may be difficult to determine with any precision the short-, medium-, and long-term impacts of SSR programming on local security, development, and political conditions given the range of other variables at play, it is possible to assess the extent to which reform processes have adhered to the core norms and principles of the SSR model.

Based on their field research, the case study researchers were tasked to assign a letter grade (A, B, C, D) for each SSR indicator, with an ‘A’ grade representing the most effective possible application of the core SSR norm/principle in the country and the ‘D’ grade signifying the worst. This annex details the criteria that informed the grading for each of the eleven SSR indicators.

1. Local Ownership

A - SSR process was fully designed and led by local stakeholders with state and non-state engagement. There is a clear consensus on the goals and end state of the process among domestic stakeholders. External donors limited to a supporting role.

B - Local ownership and leadership of the process was limited, with the bulk of local stakeholders buying into an externally designed and led process across much of the sector. Non-state engagement is confined to a narrow set of issues.

C - Little state engagement in the SSR process altogether. State involvement centers on a small coterie of reformist leaders (primarily Western oriented) supporting an externally designed and driven reform agenda. Very limited engagement of non-state actors.

D - An entirely externally designed and driven, top-down reform process with little local legitimacy. Local capacity or will to engage in the process is practically non-existent.

2. Civil Society Engagement

A - Broad-based grouping of civil society actors actively engaged as a full partner/stakeholder in the planning, implementation and oversight of every aspect of the SSR agenda.
B - Diverse set of civil society actors involved in the SSR process, but it is limited to particular issues and institutions. Civil society not perceived as a full partner in the process. Rather, it has been engaged on an ad hoc basis to fulfill particular tasks such as monitoring and evaluation or project implementation.

C - Limited outreach to narrow grouping of civil society actors in the form of information sharing, not planning, implementation or oversight. Noticeable hostility among government actors toward a more concerted civil society role in SSR. Civil society engaged only peripherally by external donors.

D - No meaningful engagement with civil society actors as a part of SSR. They are viewed as a competitor for authority and external funds by most government stakeholders and largely ignored by external donors.

3. Political Will

A - There is robust political consensus surrounding the SSR project within the executive and legislative branches of government, with external donors investing significant political capital to consolidate that consensus. SSR was included in all major peace agreement(s) and treaties.

B - Significant political will for SSR expressed by certain constituencies in government and across the state, with some donor investments of political capital. Few significant political spoilers have emerged.

C - SSR only supported by a narrow stratum of elites, and largely in rhetoric only, with powerful factions opposing the process. Donors investing limited political resources to advance the process. Several spoilers have sought to obstruct parts of the process.

D - No natural SSR constituency, with widespread distrust of a process seen as a form of external interference. Open political opposition to SSR activities with meager and ineffective donor political interventions.

4. Sustainability

A - SSR process designed with explicit consideration of long-term economic sustainability. Direct attention provided to government budget capacity over the short, medium and long-term. The security sector is projected to be completely self-sufficient in the medium to long-term. Strong emphasis placed on building public finance management practices and procedures in the security sector.

B - Significant but not universal consideration provided to economic sustainability of the
security sector. Some reform projects and institutions of the security sector more attentive to sustainability concerns than others. Some external subsidies will be required in the medium to long-term for the continued development of the security sector. There has been modest engagement to build public finance management systems in the security sector institutions.

C - Marginal consideration given to economic sustainability issues. Concern is expressed in government and donor policy and public statements, but there are few concrete plans for translating policy into practice. The security sector projects will be significantly dependent, although not entirely so, on external subsidies for the medium to long-term. There has been little effort to develop public finance management capacity.

D - Almost no attention paid to issues of economic sustainability. Reforms being implemented are not sustainable on a financial basis. The security sector will be an external dependency for the foreseeable future. No effort to construct sound public finance management systems.

5. Coordination

A - Comprehensive and holistic coordination system established that engages donors, the state, and civil society actors. Involves the establishment of coordination bodies with oversight and enforcement capabilities.

B - Modest coordination systems established surrounding particular segments and actors of the security sector. Coordination structures have some capacity and influence, but lack teeth for enforcement.

C - Ad hoc approach to coordination dependent largely on opportunistic alliances and agreements between different constellations of like-minded actors within the security sector. Few if any institutional structures established.

D - Coordination almost totally absent, with various actors advancing their own interests with little consideration of broader coherence within the sector. There have been many instances of duplication, waste and clashing interests in the security sector.

6. Holistic

A - Strong linkages have been developed across the various pillars of the SSR process, reflected in unified strategies and mechanisms for joint assessments, project implementation and monitoring and evaluation. Communication lines between stakeholders in the various security sector pillars are strong. The SSR process has been advanced according to a coherent common vision for change.
B - The SSR strategy is holistic in character, but there are few practical mechanisms to facilitate cross-sectoral coherence in implementation. There is some cross-sector dialogue, but joined up implementation activity among the various security sector pillars is modest in scope. A common vision for the security sector is recognized across its various pillars but there is uneven adherence to it in practice.

C - The references to a holistic approach in SSR strategies, policies and plans are weak. Divisions and contradictory interests within the security sector and among external donors have obstructed constructive cross-sectoral dialogue and there is no joined-up implementation. A common vision for the security sector exists, but it is largely window dressing that is not taken seriously by domestic or external stakeholders.

D - The SSR process is entirely siloed and compartmentalized in policy and practice, with no connectivity between the various pillars of the process. There is very little communication between the various SSR pillars and no joined-up implementation. A common vision for the process was never articulated.

7. Human Security Orientation

A - The SSR process in both planning and implementation has a clear people-centered vision, prioritizing human above regime security. The process has accorded equal emphasis to regime-centric and people-centric reform processes.

B - The main SSR stakeholders have articulated human security principles, but only modest headway has been made to mainstream those principles into concrete reform programming. Significant emphasis on people-centric reform programs, although the bulk of resources invested in conventional regime-centric initiatives.

C - Human security principles recognized in SSR policy and planning, but little influence on reforms, where regime-centric approaches are the norm. With the exception of a few ad hoc initiatives, the process is regime-centric and heavily statist in orientation.

D - The process is wholly regime-centric with human security considerations an afterthought at best.

8. Governance Focus

A - Good governance promotion is a central pillar of the SSR process, receiving commensurate funding and support as security force train-and-equip programs. Robust, well-funded initiatives have been established to improve governance capacity (human and institutional) within the executive, legislative and judicial branches of the state.
B - Strong attention provided to good governance promotion in the security sector, but with some variance in impacts across institutions. Still, levels of funding provided to governance projects have been disproportionately low as compared to train and equip initiatives.

C - While rhetorical support has been provided to good governance initiatives, they are clearly a secondary priority for donors and the government. Improving governance across the security sector is largely perceived as a long-term objective rather than an immediate priority. The bulk of the resources for the SSR process are channeled to developing the operational capabilities of the security forces.

D - Good governance promotion is largely ignored in the SSR process, an afterthought in policy and practice. This is typically justified with references to security or political crises that militate against complex and disruptive governance programs. The SSR process has an overwhelmingly technical focus on improving the operational capabilities of the security forces.

9. Long-Term Outlook

A - Donor and government planning is clearly long-term, with programs and strategies projected at least a decade into the future. Funding and resource commitments are extremely durable. Planning takes into account short, medium, long-term time horizons.

B - Long-term ramifications of SSR programming are considered, but most initiatives are short to medium-term in focus and duration, projecting five years into the future. Donor resourcing is perceived as reliable but no guarantees of protracted engagement exist.

C - SSR outlook is predominantly short-term, with planning and programming cycles typically 1-2 years in duration. Stakeholders aspire to long-term approaches, but these rarely materialize, principally due to adverse conditions on the ground. Donor funding is fragile and prone to cuts.

D - SSR programming and donor funding is entirely reactive and short-term. No long-term planning, and donor funding commitments are tenuous.

10. Democratic Foundations

A - Core democratic principles, including accountability, transparency and respect for human rights, are mainstreamed throughout the SSR agenda and unconditionally embraced by all major stakeholders. The sector has effectively been subordinated to democratic civilian control and is seen as a vanguard of the democratic transition.
B - The SSR process has a strong foundation in democratic principles, as reflected in planning and policy documents, but these principles have been unevenly applied in SSR programming. The sector has largely been placed under democratic civilian control although some deficits exist.

C - Democratic principles are observed on a selective and opportunistic basis by stakeholders and reformers, an outgrowth of a mixed commitment to those principles. Many aspects of the SSR agenda could be considered illiberal and undemocratic. Democratic civilian control of the security sector is largely hollow, with security sector actors wielding significant independent power.

D - Democratic principles of SSR are observed in rhetoric only, with little to no demonstrable effort to mainstream them in practice. Illiberal practices are widespread in the security sector with few remedies being considered. Violations of fundamental rights are commonplace. Security sector actors are not beholden to democratic civilian authority and have the power to undermine the civilian government at will.

11. Context Specific

A - Strong efforts have been made to tailor SSR programming to the local context, based on robust initiatives to assess and map the security sector. Attention has been paid to local culture, historical tradition and political dynamics in programming, as well as engagement with a plurality of local actors, and security/justice traditions (including non-state actors).

B - A concerted emphasis has been placed on contextualizing reforms, but the impact on programming has been piecemeal. Adequate assessments and mapping have been undertaken to inform planning and reform design, although with limited engagement of a broad cross-section of societal actors.

C - Limited efforts have been made to contextualize the SSR process. External actors demonstrate inconsistent desire to understand and engage local context. Assessment and mapping exercises were weak and had little influence on planning and programming. Little engagement with local non-state actors and traditions.

D - SSR processes and programs have been largely transplanted from other contexts with marginal adjustments for local conditions. No adequate assessments or mapping done to inform programming and societal actors outside of a narrow clique of elites within the state were largely ignored.
ANNEX 2: TIMOR-LESTE – SUMMARY OF INDICATOR GRADES
The Centre for Security Governance (CSG) is a non-profit, non-partisan think tank dedicated to the study of security and governance transitions in fragile, failed and conflict-affected states. Based in Canada, the CSG maintains a global, multi-disciplinary network of researchers, practitioners and academics engaged in the international peace and security field.

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